PEACE, I HOPE, WITH HONOR1

A. INTERNAL POLITICS IN ISRAEL

The presence of disunity about the method ... among the nation's people, about the rightness of the war aims, makes it impossible for a war of any duration to be

fought effectively and won 2

This conclusion, arrived at by the distinguished historian Barbara Tuchman, properly defines the delicate position of the State of Israel. The nation is divided in its approach to security and foreign relations. A single political party cannot entertain a stable majority in the Knesset to ensure political support for policies, subscribed to, by same party. Moreover, notwithstanding a political party's ability to form a government in partnership with other parties, it is wrong to assume that such a government based on a coalition, ignores the opinion of a distinguished minority in the Knesset.

We should not underestimate Israel's international position. However, most important is unity amongst the people of Israel. The "stability" of the political map "in the middle" challenges any one of the two leading political parties in their efforts to implement a defined policy. It is the cause of Israel's inability to initiate policies, and the greatest of all political risks facing Israel. Whereas the left suggests "territory for peace"3 the right claims "peace for peace", and Israel is left in the wilderness.

To the above, we must add the following unfortunate consideration. Some citizens of the State of Israel, even elected officials in the Knesset often fail to appreciate the appropriate norms and limitations in exercising democracy. When a group of politicians wish to challenge a government's policy, lobbying in the Knesset is legal; voting against the government is appropriate; why, even demonstrations must be allowed. Yet, in some instances, Israeli politicians, failing in the above methods, took the liberty of approaching the Oval Office or the Department of State, trying to induce the latter to embrace a policy, and press the Government of Israel to adopt a similar course, notwithstanding the fact that same scheme was not supported by the majority of Israelis, as voiced in a general election. This is not a just expression of democracy. Indeed, it is properly a distortion of proper political conduct. But it exists, in our midst. Members of the labor party "lobbied" against a Likud led government; members of the Likud are trying to compromise the policies adopted by the labor led government.

B. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Israel's international position is vulnerable. Indeed, on the one hand Israel maintains diplomatic relations with more countries it ever did in its short history

[inclusive of countries, never to recognize Israel in the past like The People Republic of China or countries that recognized Israel de facto but not the jure, India. On the other hand Israel's unique position as an ally will deteriorate, as the cold war and the superpowers' tension crashed to point zero. The superpowers' interests in supporting states around the globe is declining. The division of the world into influenced zones which was imposed after the second world war has come to an end. The world should be facing international peace4. Even the war in the gulf did not challenge the basic of the euphoria. We should not underestimate the danger of the tensions in the Baltic or the new commonwealth. Neither should we ignore the tension in some parts of the third world. We must therefore try and solve the conflict in the Middle East and deviate attentions to the tension in other parts of the world.

Moreover, delaying peace process in the Middle East will by itself, become an incentive to hostile Arab rulers to attract non conventional armament experts who became unemployed in the ex-USSR. In addition, members in what was the Warsaw Pact, inclusive of the former Soviet Union might be encouraged to sell their available non conventional armaments with the hope of contributing to those countries shattered economies. In other words, the answer to the question Who is the mideast Pillar? analyzed by George Will5 will not be as vital in the future as it was in the past.

In addition, attention should be paid to the growing gap within the Jewish Communities around the world. The Bush administration in Washington, succeeded in establishing a wedge within the American Jewish community. The latter does not constantly unite behind the State of Israel, the deeper the gap within the Jewish community in the USA, the weaker Israel's position is in Washington. Paul Kennedy, in his brilliant book The Rise and fall of the Great powers, when referring to the USA-lsraeli "special" relations, writes, inter alia, ''towards which, a powerfully organized domestic lobby presses for unflinching support for an isolated but militarily efficient Israef'6. It seems that this "domestic lobby" will not be as influential in the future as it was in the past. Consequently, the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem will deteriorate to the point, familiar to the Israelis, when searching for the junction of the French-lsraeli relation, in the days, prior to the 1967 Six Days War. In any event these relationship limited Israel's liberty to conduct foreign policy to the best of its judgement“. The euphoria developed due to the war in the Gulf ended shortly after the termination of hostilities. Relation improved only when President George Bush's Presidential election campaign took an alarming dive. Indeed, the change of government in Israel helped Israel's image7, but this should not be looked upon as a new wave. Israel is yet to face more pressure as soon as Washington will settle down back to business. Prime Minister Shamir was not the first Israeli prime Minister to be challenge by American pressure. Prime Minister's Rabin relation with President Ford new very hostile moments.

In gross variance to the policies adopted by previous governments in Israel, Prime Minister Rabin's government has taken a new, totally unfamiliar venue. A daring policy, necessitating the adoption of unpopular moves and revoking promises made to the most dedicated of supporters. Such unfamiliar venues which consequences are always irreversible are to be researched carefully. Indeed, the warnings of Paul Johnson should be brought to the attention of the Israeli leadership. Mr. Johonson

writes;
When we are working on a problem, in science or anything else, we form a hypothesis and then endeavor to verify it empirically. Human nature being what it is, if the hypothesis is exciting in embodying a new and important truth, or if it accords with our preconceived ideas, we tend to look eagerly for evidence which supports it, and to ignore or brush aside evidence which doesn't fit. Worse still, if negative evidence thrusts itself on us, we brazenly modify the theory to accommodate it, instead of bravely admitting the hypothesis is false and starting

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all over again

Moreover; he who does not remember the past is condemed to releave it. In his book, Hitler and Stalin, Parallel lives8, Alan Bullock analyses the policies adopted by the United States and Great Britain in regard to Russia. Notwithstanding the fact that the Second World War would have been a different war, if not for the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, Stalin led the Western powers to agree to the division of Europe. Poland - because of whom, England and France declared war on Germany, and on whose account the abovementioned agreement was signed, was left to become a Russian satellite. Stalin succeeded where Hitler failed. Lord Bullock writes, inter alia,

This [forming Popular Democratic Fronts - SZJ] was soon extended to East Germany as the german Democratic Republic, and for the next forty years, punctuated by the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the Czech of 1968, Central and Eastern Europe was governed by satellite regimes of the Soviet Union, a Stalinist order in place of the earlier, imposed on them by Hitler and the Nazis.8A

Henry Kissinger explains.

Stalin possessed no conceptual apparatus to enable him to forgo territory on behalf of goodwill, or "objective" reality for the mood of the moment. Therefore, he was bound to propose to his democratic Allies the same arrangements that he asked Hitler a year earlier ... [Stalin] would take from each temporary partner whatever was possible through diplomacy, and seize by force whatever had not

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been granted to him freely - as long as he could do so without risking war

The above, with the West acquiescence and blessing. Indeed, England surranded Poland to Soviet rule notwithstanding the fact that His mejesty's government knew that Poland will suffer as much under the red army as it deed under the Wehrmacht. Indeed Churchill acknowledged that the German revelations about the mass murder of 5,000 Polish officers by the Russians in Katyn in the spring of 1943 were true8c. He was even discussing with Stalin the latter's undertakings to keep Poland a democracy9.

The United States and England proved to lack proper foreign policy. They succeeded when military operations was the instrument [Germany] and failed when diplomacy was called for [Russia]. Indeed, Maksim Litvinov who served as USSR's foreign minister before Vyacheslav Molotov "told reporters [in 1944] that Stalin had imperial designs on Eastern Europe and wondered aloud why the West did not intervene"9* This, notwithstanding the fact that Churchill "never put [Katyn] out of his mind"9A1.

[Anthony] Eden has received harsh treatment from historianns, but he had a keener eye than Churchill when it came to seeing into the future. In 1941 he warned that at the end of the war the Soviet would want to keep their gains from their pact with Hitler, and that since their armies would have played the major part in defeating the Nazis, they would be in a position ti take what they wanted; all the western allies coulds do was to acquiesce now, in the hope if restraining Soviet appetite later. As early as this it was clear that appeasement of the Germans

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would be followed by appeasement of the Soviet Union.

Stalin demonstrated his intentions in Potsdam, where Truman and Churchill surrounded Poland to the USSR in consideration for unkept promises. Inter alia, "once again free elections for Poland were promised for the immediate future [by Stalin - SZJ] but not then held96" Whereas President Truman failed to challenge the task of Soviet hegemony, his predecessor refused to recognize its potential threat.

He Rejected the idea that a total defeat of Germany might create a vacuum,

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which victorious Soviet Union might then try to fill

Amazing as it may sound, this phenomenal scheme was repeated through the pages of the twentieth century.

The agreement with Stalin was indeed humiliating.

A formal agreement on the mutual repatriation of Soviet and American solders and civilians was drawn up and signed at Yalta in february 1945. Although nothing in the agreement required American and British commanders to forcibly repatriate Soviet citizens against their will, the Soviet insisted on it and the Western allies complied, shiping trainload after trainload of former prisoners of war back to the Soviet Union. A special organization for repatriation of Soviet prisoners had been

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set up under the Sovnarkom ...

These prisoners became Stalin's prisoners upon their return to the Sovuet union.

Korea10. Barbara Tuchmanu elaborated on Mao Zedong's and Zhou Enlai's request to come to Washington in order to negotiate an agreement with the USA. The request was held back by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, "one of the big 'ifs'"12 was what would have happened, if "the massage had been duly forwarded to the 'highest officials'"13. Mrs Tuchman concludes that

It is conceivable that there might have been no korean War"14.
Indeed, contrary to US's understanding

We know today that soon after winning its civil war, Communist China came to consider the Soviet Union as the most serious threat to its independence14*.

Cuba1S. The USa had a "clear" one sided policy in regard to Cuba, as Gaddis Smith writes;
Although keeping Cuba out of the hands of a strong and hostile power was one of

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the oldest objectives of American foreign policy