A. INTERNAL POLITICS IN ISRAEL
The presence of disunity
about the method ... among the nation's people, about the rightness of
the war aims, makes it impossible for a war of any duration to be
fought effectively and won 2
This
conclusion, arrived at by the distinguished historian Barbara Tuchman,
properly defines the delicate position of the State of Israel. The
nation is divided in its approach to security and foreign relations. A
single political party cannot entertain a stable majority in the Knesset
to ensure political support for policies, subscribed to, by same party.
Moreover, notwithstanding a political party's ability to form a
government in partnership with other parties, it is wrong to assume that
such a government based on a coalition, ignores the opinion of a
distinguished minority in the Knesset.
We should not underestimate
Israel's international position. However, most important is unity
amongst the people of Israel. The "stability" of the political map "in
the middle" challenges any one of the two leading political parties in
their efforts to implement a defined policy. It is the cause of Israel's
inability to initiate policies, and the greatest of all political risks
facing Israel. Whereas the left suggests "territory for peace"3 the
right claims "peace for peace", and Israel is left in the wilderness.
To
the above, we must add the following unfortunate consideration. Some
citizens of the State of Israel, even elected officials in the Knesset
often fail to appreciate the appropriate norms and limitations in
exercising democracy. When a group of politicians wish to challenge a
government's policy, lobbying in the Knesset is legal; voting against
the government is appropriate; why, even demonstrations must be allowed.
Yet, in some instances, Israeli politicians, failing in the above
methods, took the liberty of approaching the Oval Office or the
Department of State, trying to induce the latter to embrace a policy,
and press the Government of Israel to adopt a similar course,
notwithstanding the fact that same scheme was not supported by the
majority of Israelis, as voiced in a general election. This is not a
just expression of democracy. Indeed, it is properly a distortion of
proper political conduct. But it exists, in our midst. Members of the
labor party "lobbied" against a Likud led government; members of the
Likud are trying to compromise the policies adopted by the labor led
government.
B. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Israel's international
position is vulnerable. Indeed, on the one hand Israel maintains
diplomatic relations with more countries it ever did in its short
history
[inclusive of countries, never to recognize Israel in the
past like The People Republic of China or countries that recognized
Israel de facto but not the jure, India. On the other hand Israel's
unique position as an ally will deteriorate, as the cold war and the
superpowers' tension crashed to point zero. The superpowers' interests
in supporting states around the globe is declining. The division of the
world into influenced zones which was imposed after the second world war
has come to an end. The world should be facing international peace4.
Even the war in the gulf did not challenge the basic of the euphoria. We
should not underestimate the danger of the tensions in the Baltic or
the new commonwealth. Neither should we ignore the tension in some parts
of the third world. We must therefore try and solve the conflict in the
Middle East and deviate attentions to the tension in other parts of the
world.
Moreover, delaying peace process in the Middle East will
by itself, become an incentive to hostile Arab rulers to attract non
conventional armament experts who became unemployed in the ex-USSR. In
addition, members in what was the Warsaw Pact, inclusive of the former
Soviet Union might be encouraged to sell their available non
conventional armaments with the hope of contributing to those countries
shattered economies. In other words, the answer to the question Who is
the mideast Pillar? analyzed by George Will5 will not be as vital in the
future as it was in the past.
In addition, attention should be
paid to the growing gap within the Jewish Communities around the world.
The Bush administration in Washington, succeeded in establishing a wedge
within the American Jewish community. The latter does not constantly
unite behind the State of Israel, the deeper the gap within the Jewish
community in the USA, the weaker Israel's position is in Washington.
Paul Kennedy, in his brilliant book The Rise and fall of the Great
powers, when referring to the USA-lsraeli "special" relations, writes,
inter alia, ''towards which, a powerfully organized domestic lobby
presses for unflinching support for an isolated but militarily efficient
Israef'6. It seems that this "domestic lobby" will not be as
influential in the future as it was in the past. Consequently, the
relationship between Washington and Jerusalem will deteriorate to the
point, familiar to the Israelis, when searching for the junction of the
French-lsraeli relation, in the days, prior to the 1967 Six Days War. In
any event these relationship limited Israel's liberty to conduct
foreign policy to the best of its judgement“. The euphoria developed due
to the war in the Gulf ended shortly after the termination of
hostilities. Relation improved only when President George Bush's
Presidential election campaign took an alarming dive. Indeed, the change
of government in Israel helped Israel's image7, but this should not be
looked upon as a new wave. Israel is yet to face more pressure as soon
as Washington will settle down back to business. Prime Minister Shamir
was not the first Israeli prime Minister to be challenge by American
pressure. Prime Minister's Rabin relation with President Ford new very
hostile moments.
In gross variance to the policies adopted by
previous governments in Israel, Prime Minister Rabin's government has
taken a new, totally unfamiliar venue. A daring policy, necessitating
the adoption of unpopular moves and revoking promises made to the most
dedicated of supporters. Such unfamiliar venues which consequences are
always irreversible are to be researched carefully. Indeed, the warnings
of Paul Johnson should be brought to the attention of the Israeli
leadership. Mr. Johonson
writes;
When we are working on a
problem, in science or anything else, we form a hypothesis and then
endeavor to verify it empirically. Human nature being what it is, if the
hypothesis is exciting in embodying a new and important truth, or if it
accords with our preconceived ideas, we tend to look eagerly for
evidence which supports it, and to ignore or brush aside evidence which
doesn't fit. Worse still, if negative evidence thrusts itself on us, we
brazenly modify the theory to accommodate it, instead of bravely
admitting the hypothesis is false and starting
7A
all over again
Moreover;
he who does not remember the past is condemed to releave it. In his
book, Hitler and Stalin, Parallel lives8, Alan Bullock analyses the
policies adopted by the United States and Great Britain in regard to
Russia. Notwithstanding the fact that the Second World War would have
been a different war, if not for the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement,
Stalin led the Western powers to agree to the division of Europe. Poland
- because of whom, England and France declared war on Germany, and on
whose account the abovementioned agreement was signed, was left to
become a Russian satellite. Stalin succeeded where Hitler failed. Lord
Bullock writes, inter alia,
This [forming Popular Democratic
Fronts - SZJ] was soon extended to East Germany as the german Democratic
Republic, and for the next forty years, punctuated by the Hungarian
revolt of 1956 and the Czech of 1968, Central and Eastern Europe was
governed by satellite regimes of the Soviet Union, a Stalinist order in
place of the earlier, imposed on them by Hitler and the Nazis.8A
Henry Kissinger explains.
Stalin
possessed no conceptual apparatus to enable him to forgo territory on
behalf of goodwill, or "objective" reality for the mood of the moment.
Therefore, he was bound to propose to his democratic Allies the same
arrangements that he asked Hitler a year earlier ... [Stalin] would take
from each temporary partner whatever was possible through diplomacy,
and seize by force whatever had not
8R
been granted to him freely - as long as he could do so without risking war
The
above, with the West acquiescence and blessing. Indeed, England
surranded Poland to Soviet rule notwithstanding the fact that His
mejesty's government knew that Poland will suffer as much under the red
army as it deed under the Wehrmacht. Indeed Churchill acknowledged that
the German revelations about the mass murder of 5,000 Polish officers by
the Russians in Katyn in the spring of 1943 were true8c. He was even
discussing with Stalin the latter's undertakings to keep Poland a
democracy9.
The United States and England proved to lack proper
foreign policy. They succeeded when military operations was the
instrument [Germany] and failed when diplomacy was called for [Russia].
Indeed, Maksim Litvinov who served as USSR's foreign minister before
Vyacheslav Molotov "told reporters [in 1944] that Stalin had imperial
designs on Eastern Europe and wondered aloud why the West did not
intervene"9* This, notwithstanding the fact that Churchill "never put
[Katyn] out of his mind"9A1.
[Anthony] Eden has received harsh
treatment from historianns, but he had a keener eye than Churchill when
it came to seeing into the future. In 1941 he warned that at the end of
the war the Soviet would want to keep their gains from their pact with
Hitler, and that since their armies would have played the major part in
defeating the Nazis, they would be in a position ti take what they
wanted; all the western allies coulds do was to acquiesce now, in the
hope if restraining Soviet appetite later. As early as this it was clear
that appeasement of the Germans
9A2
would be followed by appeasement of the Soviet Union.
Stalin
demonstrated his intentions in Potsdam, where Truman and Churchill
surrounded Poland to the USSR in consideration for unkept promises.
Inter alia, "once again free elections for Poland were promised for the
immediate future [by Stalin - SZJ] but not then held96" Whereas
President Truman failed to challenge the task of Soviet hegemony, his
predecessor refused to recognize its potential threat.
He Rejected the idea that a total defeat of Germany might create a vacuum,
9C
which victorious Soviet Union might then try to fill
Amazing as it may sound, this phenomenal scheme was repeated through the pages of the twentieth century.
The agreement with Stalin was indeed humiliating.
A
formal agreement on the mutual repatriation of Soviet and American
solders and civilians was drawn up and signed at Yalta in february 1945.
Although nothing in the agreement required American and British
commanders to forcibly repatriate Soviet citizens against their will,
the Soviet insisted on it and the Western allies complied, shiping
trainload after trainload of former prisoners of war back to the Soviet
Union. A special organization for repatriation of Soviet prisoners had
been
9D
set up under the Sovnarkom ...
These prisoners became Stalin's prisoners upon their return to the Sovuet union.
Korea10.
Barbara Tuchmanu elaborated on Mao Zedong's and Zhou Enlai's request to
come to Washington in order to negotiate an agreement with the USA. The
request was held back by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, "one of the big
'ifs'"12 was what would have happened, if "the massage had been duly
forwarded to the 'highest officials'"13. Mrs Tuchman concludes that
It is conceivable that there might have been no korean War"14.
Indeed, contrary to US's understanding
We
know today that soon after winning its civil war, Communist China came
to consider the Soviet Union as the most serious threat to its
independence14*.
Cuba1S. The USa had a "clear" one sided policy in regard to Cuba, as Gaddis Smith writes;
Although keeping Cuba out of the hands of a strong and hostile power was one of
15A
the oldest objectives of American foreign policy
