Indeed the end of History, indeed the Last Man?
Shneor
Z. [Zalli] Jaffe
Francis
Fukuyama, in his new book The End of History and the Last man, has
indeed
Demonstrated
unique thinking and deep understanding. The book cannot be just read, it
must be
studied. However, Mr. Fukuyama's speculations do call for some comments.
I
have no authority in philosophy, or in history. As a layman who enjoys reading
the book, I also enjoy writing about it.
In
his introduction to the book, FF writes:
"There are
many historical contemporary examples of technologically advanced capitalism coexisting with political authoritarianism, from Meiji Japan Singapore Thailand"
To
the above I will only add the clarification that within the latter part of the
twentieth
century
a country like Singapore
can succeed as the centralization of political power was not followed by
centralization and control of "the market". Moreover, free market in Singapore
and in Thailand
was followed by limited political flexibility. Communism failed as the market
was not free, and politics was control; which brought about the
collapse. Here I will refer the reader to Paul Kennedy’s The rise and fall
of the Great Powers whose thesis was indeed the emphasis on the economic
considerations as the root for any rise and fall.
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| Francis Fukuyama |
modern
natural science' is in effect an economic interpretation of historical
changes." or 'the mechanism we have
laid out is essentially an economic interpretation of history'. I am
surprised
that Fukuyama does not mention Kennedy’s very important work.
The
end of history according to Fukuyama
is Democracy. His theory commences with a
question.
"Are we simply witnessing a momentary upturn in the
fortunes of liberal democracy, or is there some longer term pattern of
development at work that will eventually lead all countries in the direction of liberal democracy?"
Indeed,
Fukuyama
suggests that democracies of today will maintain their liberal approaches [the
end of history], as he writes:
"And if we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a
world substantially different from our own, in which there is no
apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent fundamental improvement over the
current order, then, we must also take into consideration the possibility that history itself
might be at an end.
The historicist philosopher would be compelled to
accept liberal democracy's own claims to superiority and finality. Die
Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht: World history is the final arbiter of right."
There
are two formulas with which to analyze the future. A theory based on the
researcher's logic and his ability to analyze. Another scheme suggests a
comparison of present and future circumstances with similar occurrences in the
past, and drawing conclusions based on resemblances or dissimilarities. As
logical as the former formula might be, as long as it was not challenged by
history it cannot be qualified but as a speculation. The latter formula's
reality was confirmed by history itself.
Moreover,
two hundred years in history is a short period, surely not a long enough period
upon
which to establish eternity.
First,
There is no guarantee that democracy will prevail. It did not in the past, as
the end of
Second,
democracies have to entertain non-democratic measures when challenged by any
risks;
the allies during the Second World War, the USA and its allies during Operation
Desert
Storm.
Third,
what is the justification to our assumption that democracy has an ability to
survive
more
than a dictatorship? All governments could be challenged by the same
trials. And as
history
confirmed us, democracies collapsed because of economic considerations just as
dictatorships
did.
Naturally,
dictatorships do face additional risks with which democracy is not familiar, as
the former's stability is guaranteed by the safety of a small group or one
person. However, as no political system
can guarantee "food for all", no system is warranted eternity.
Fourth,
stability of democracy is founded inter alia on its international
relations. One
consideration
to the collapse of the Weimar
Republic Germany 's
enormous
undertakings
to foreign governments.
It
is feasible that in "the long run" dictatorships will not be able to
withhold information
from
citizens, which exposure will force totalitarianism to amend. Indeed, if
democracies
boycott
dictatorships, such boycott could serve as an incentive to the latter’s'
conversions.
Alas,
democracies of today, support dictatorships for just or unjust cause.
Moreover,
Fukuyama
suggests that the technological advancement will contribute to
democracy's
stability.
"It is clearly possible to destroy the fruits of modern
natural science; indeed, modern technology has given us the means to do so in a
matter of minutes. But is it possible to destroy modern natural science itself, to release us from the grip
that the scientific method has held over our lives and return mankind as a whole permanently to a
pre-scientific level of civilization?
Yet even these extreme
circumstances would appear unlikely to break the grip of technology over human civilization, and
science's ability to replace itself."
With
respect, we might not go back "to a prescientific level of
civilization", but technology
can
send us back hundreds of years, and go on doing so, whenever civilization makes
a few steps
forward. A war could lead the modern world to the position of those states
today that might
have the knowledge, yet are "incapable of
generating technology or applying it successfully"
Modern technology by itself could serve as democracy's worst enemy. One Atom Bomb will suffice for a few hundred years' retreat. The more we advance, the easier will it be for a small group or even an individual to cause horrendous damage.
Indeed,Fukuyama does
"fear" the conventional challenge. What if the USA is attacked
with non-conventional
weapons? If The Fifth Horseman had a different ending? Would New York
Modern technology by itself could serve as democracy's worst enemy. One Atom Bomb will suffice for a few hundred years' retreat. The more we advance, the easier will it be for a small group or even an individual to cause horrendous damage.
Indeed,
be able to survive as a democracy? Rationing of
food services would compromise
democracy.
So will all emergency measures that will have to be adopted. The fact that a non conventional weapon can draw us back, is a
challenge to Fukuyama's assumption that we are
in an irreversible path towards the end of history. In other words, we
did not see eye to eye with Fukuyama 's statement that
"The dominance of modern natural science over human life
is not likely to be reversed under any foreseeable circumstances, even
under the most extreme circumstances.''
Indeed,
Fukuyama
writes:
''Liberal ideas have no force independent of the human
actors who put them into effect, and if Andropov or Chernenko had lived
longer, or if Gorbachev himself had a different personality, the course of events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
between 1985 and 1991 would have been
quite different.''
Indeed,
so. However, this statement serves as Fukuyama's own "admission" that
occurrences beyond men's control - inclusive of the development of "modern
natural science" - lead history. Stability cannot serve as sole guarantee.
After all, Adolf Hitler was elected in a Democracy. Or, where would Kuwait have
been today if Andropov was as young as Gorbachev? Would the United Nation
support Desert Storm? No. Would the West risk a World War with the Soviet Union ? Who knows. Would Kuwait remain Iraq 's 19th
canton? Maybe. how would the world react to 65% of world oil production being
controlled by a barbarian supported by a
world power? The world was blessed with Andropov's early death and Gorbachev's emergence. can't the opposite
occur tomorrow?
"Modern natural science confers a decisive military
advantage on those societies that can develop, produce and deploy technology
the most effectively, and the relative advantage conferred by technology increases as the rate of
technological change accelerates."
Indeed,
Fukuyama limits the generality of the above theory [Vietnam and the United
States; Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union]. His reasoning for the same limitation is based "in the very
different political stakes of the two sides. With respect we suggest that the
reasoning for the failure of technology advanced powers against less capable
countries [or groups] is based on various grounds. Afghanistan and Vietnam are
two examples. You may add to it
England's increasing difficulties in Northern Ireland, Israel's
challenges in the West Bank and Gaza. India 's violent
religious and ethnic crises. In all cases, the predicaments are found in escalating disputes within Goliath
itself, and the inability of any army to control hostile populations for a long period of time. US's
success in Puerto Rico and England 's
success in Gibraltar
are pillared in the respective populations to same rules.
With
respect, this might be true, to a limited extent. Human sufferings, initiated
by countries did not terminate. Stalin and Russia, Poll Pot and Cambodia, the
Christian Militia and Sabra Shatila,
Iraq and the Kurdish Minority, Hafez-el-Assad and the inhabitants of Hama,
Yugoslavia. The question is what is the criterion. The methods [the concentration
camps] then Nazi Germany or present day
Slovakia are "pathological and extreme condition"; or the ends, the
inhuman sufferings and death in large scales. If the latter is the criterion, then
fascism is not an "extreme
condition".
Fukuyama suggests that
economic considerations were not necessarily the sole cause of
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| Hafez al-Assad |
revolutions.
''An economic account of history gets us to the Promised
Land of liberal democracy, but it does not quite deliver us to the
other side... But this process does not explain democracy itself, for if we look more deeply into the
process, we find that democracy is never chosen for economic reasons.''
This
assumption is, with respect improvable. As all modern revolutions were heavily
associated
with economic crisis, at least in regard to some societies within the political
entity. The French Revolution was rooted
on various economic predicaments, the most famous dictum of which, is
identified with Marie Antoinette, "if there is no bread let the peasant
eat cakes". Had the inhabitants in the American continent enjoyed a stable
economy, the American revolution would
have been a more difficult task, if not a failure. Yet, as Barbara Tuchman verifies Britain "ruled the waves"
and all commercial roots to the American Continents.
"It is not
sufficient to point to "problems" to contemporary liberal
democracies, even if they are serious ones like budgets,
deficits, inflation, crime, or drugs. A "problem" does not become a "contradiction" unless
it is so serious that it not only cannot be solved within the system but
corrodes the legitimacy of the system itself
such that the latter collapses under its own weight.''
Yet
a certain level of physical destruction or chaos may devastate the system. Here
we face a dangerous contradiction. On the one hand democracy
offers inter alia, the freedom to think, and consequently, to develop. On the
other hand, such thoughts and developments are to be limited, they should not
reach a level of distraction.
Alas,
democracy did not survive through all stages of history. Democracy was born
again
at
a late stage as a consequence from the dialectics as explained by George h.
Hegel. We
therefore
cannot judge Democracy's success, based on the 20th century, as it was not
present
in the human history from the beginning". In other words, Fukuyama 's suggestion
that
continuity should serve as a vote of confidence to the future reliability of
democracy
should
not be concluded from the length of time democracy is being utilized.
With
all due respect, the accuracy of this theory is based on other human
beings' desire for the "banana". This will be cleared by attending to
the following question. What would have happened if human beings did not have
to eat neither to drink or to dress or in need of shelter? As we would have not
received the basic needs, we would have had not the blue collar
worker, and so white collar would have no ability to survive as such,
either. Winning a medal in a swimming pool calls, to begin with, for someone to
build the pool. Who will build it? He who is in need to feed himself and his
family. Those who participated in the past in the battle that enabled Kojeve's
hero to seize the enemy's flag, participated in the battle for monetary
consideration, with which they will feed their loved ones. Did the poor soldier
not need to eat, who would have helped the knight to get hold of the flag? [or
who will make the flag?] Who would have built the swimming pool for our
champion to compete for the desired medal? In other words, some human beings
desire ultra animal satisfactions. but it cannot be fulfilled unless the
majority of humanity is satisfied with the banana. Indeed, Fukuyama writes that -
''The universal and homogeneous state that appears at the
end of history can thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and
tradition. The human historical process that leads up to it has been driven forward equally by the progressive unfolding of modern natural science,
and by the struggle for recognition.''
We
do not believe these two pillars to have the same weight and significance. All have
to eat. And as emphasized hereinabove, if not for the need to eat, there would
have been no flag to take, no medal to win. In other words, the development of Thymos,
or the "struggle of recognition" cannot survive if not for the
economic considerations of those who have not.
Is
this really the case? What would have been the opinion of many people if a born
baby was not accompanied by a financial burden [food, clothing, shelter,
entertainment]. It is true that many dispute the subject, economic
consideration notwithstanding; religious groups, moral associations; "a
free body of a free woman" groups etc. However, in many cases the cases
the enthusiastic supporter is not the leading intellectual, but the greengrocer
in Valclav Havel's story.
This
thesis was never challenged. Eastern Europe
was attracted by the political system of the west because it proved itself
economically. The only example in recent history where a challenge to the
political system took place, in spite of economic stability was South Korea . Singapore , Taiwan or Brunei , who
share economic richness are demonstrating political stability, notwithstanding
the fact that democracy is limited or non existent in these countries.
If
it wasn't for economic grievances, the ousted first secretary would still be
driving his Volvo. 'Personal corruption' no doubt, added insult to injury,
but could not by itself bring about the second revolution in the Soviet
Union. The Volvo and other incidents could be compared to the murder of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by Gavrilo Pricip in Sarajevo , and its relation to the
commencement of the First World War.
Fukuyama: ''It
is only the thymotic man, the man of anger who is jealous of his own dignity
and the dignity of his fellow citizens, the man who feels that his worth is
constituted by something more than the complex set of desires that make up his
physical existence - it is this man alone who is willing to walk in
front of a tank or confront a line of soldiers.''
We
believe that Fukuyama is hastening his conclusions here. Thymos is an important
factor of human behavior, yet, not less important and influential is the sex
desire, and hunger. People will "walk in front of a tank or confront a
line of soldiers" if their children are hungry, even if they have no
Thymos whatsoever. Thymos is but one out of many desires of mankind. Fukuyama himself writes
that "factions result not just from the clash between the desiring
parts of different men's souls (i.e., economic interests), but between thymotic
parts as well".
''The attack on Megalothymia and its lack of
respectability in our present day world therefore should incline us to agree
with Nietzsche that those early modern philosophers who wanted to banish
the more visible forms of Thymos from civil society have been quite successful.
What has taken place of megalothymia is a combination of two things. The
first is a blossoming of the desiring part of the soul, which manifests itself
as a thoroughgoing economization of life.''
The
description cannot be accurate. A philosopher does not change the world,
and he cannot "banish the more visible form of civil society".
In a similar way we cannot say that medical science invented cancer or
aids. It was there earlier, only to be found. Earlier philosophers did
not abolish any form of Thymos. Present day form of Thymos was
explored on a much later stage in human chronicles. Indeed, Fukuyama himself seems to support this view
in quoting Hegel. As he writes inter alia;
''In the preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel
explains that philosophy "is its own time apprehended in thought",
and that as a philosopher one can no more go beyond one's time and predict the
future, a man could leap over the giant statue that once stood on the island of Rhodes
Fukuyama: ''For democracy to work, however,
citizens of democratic states must forget the instrumental roots of their
values, and develop a certain irrational thymotic pride in their
political system and way of life ... Development of this kind of pride in
democracy, or the assimilation of democratic values into the citizen's sense of
his own self, is what is meant by the creation of a "democratic" or
"civic culture". Such a culture is critical to the long-term health
and stability of democracies, since no real world society can long survive based
on rational calculation and desire alone.''
Respectfully,
it would be wrong to convert democratic values to "thymus". Indeed
Fukuyama himself in criticizing Samuel Huntington's analysis and challenging
the developments in catholic-oriented countries towards democracy, points, inter
alia to a cause of change being the fact that the "rising levels of socio-economic
development had taken place in most catholic countries by the 1960s".
Values
of justice and fairness will not be able to survive if constantly challenged by
economic crises. A hungry man will sacrifice democracy for a loaf of bread, as
the Germans did to the Weimar Republic. No rule of law, be it a monarchy, aristocracy,
a totalitarian or a democracy, is guaranteed safety against the hungry mob.
"Thymos or the desire for recognition is ... the seat of what
social scientists call "value". This, with respect, is an assumption
that will not tolerate any thymus differing from the values expressed by the Fukuyama "good thymus".
Alas, democracy is based on Thymos, is to hope that democracy is well
supported morally and intellectually. This cannot guarantee the safety of
democracy. Only if people will understand the logic of democracy, the
advantages of democracy vs. the disadvantages of any other rule, will democracy
prevail.
Democracy
developed, due, as a prime reason, to economic considerations. And, indeed, as
mentioned before, an economic crisis will challenge democracy's stability. The
weak will support democracy, as it is he who will be granted equal opportunity.
The strong, as same will reduce the threat of the weak majority to the strong
minority. After all the strong of today cannot rely on Nichlo Machiavelli's guarantee
of success of his theory.
Why
does Fukuyama
find difficulties in rationalizing the desire for work and not for sex? People
might find satisfaction in working well just as much as they will enjoy
passionate love-making.
Here
Fukuyama gives Britain credit
beyond just. If we wish to consider the most favorable approach in analyzing
the liquidation of the British Empire , three
considerations should be attended to. a. An escalating conflict with a
hostile population, which brought b. the refusal of public opinion
within England
to pay the heavy price in blood and money for maintaining the Empire. And only c. if at all, the above analysis of Fukuyama . Indeed, Fukuyama was right in his
analysis of why the liquidation of the Empire was so costly? because the
liquidation was not executed voluntarily, based on morality. The Empire was not
disintegrated because of England
but in spite of England .
With respect Fukuyama's assumption that "Britain could plausibly have
tried to hang on to its colonies as France did after the war" is inaccurate. England tried "to hang
on" but did not succeed. Most states to gain independence from England paid
and made England
pay in blood and money. Those that did not are still under the crown, Gibraltar , Ireland Canada
and Australia .
Fukuyama: ''Like
religion, nationalism is in no danger of disappearing, but like religion, it
appears to have lost much of its ability to stimulate Europeans to risk their
comfortable lives in great acts of imperialism.''
This
statement’s accuracy is demonstrated only in some parts of the world;
the USA, Western Europe, [with
escalating distractions in many countries, especially in Germany], Australia,
Israel, etc. Alas, the utopia as described by Fukuyama is a far cry in many parts of the
world. India
and Pakistan ,
the civil wars in numerous parts of Africa , Morocco and the
Sahara Desert Union , or nationalistic tensions in France , or to a
lesser extent Belgium
or Canada .
Moreover, in those countries where Fukuyama's formula's principle is
implemented, every test shakes the stability of same applicability. The King
affair in Los Angeles
is one example. Germany 's
new Nazis and France’s La Penn are further examples. The stability of
Fukuyama's formula will be verified when overcoming crises are unshaken. After
all, many Germans were optimistic about the future of the Weimar Republic
Sorry.
Fukuyama avoids
the question "why imperialism"? Will Iraq relieve Kurdistan
from its strangle? Not voluntarily. Nationalism is not the issue, as far as Iraq is
concerned, but the richness of the land in Kurdistan .
Although Saddam Hussein tried the nationalistic motives when invading Kuwait ,
petroleum was a more accurate incentive for the invasion that brought about Desert
Storm. In other words, decrease of nationalism will bring about a decrease
in international tension. However, nationalism might be replaced once again [as
indeed it did after the 1917 revolution in Russia and later formation of the USSR ]. We might
even anticipate economic conflict to conclude in the breaking of hostilities.
In order to guarantee the liquidation of tension, to reach "the end of
history" in this level, we must find a guaranteed formula for attending to a grave economic crisis. As such a formula was not yet invented, military
conflicts will continue, which might compromise the stability of some
democracies, such as the new Russia ,
South America or the future democracies in the
Balkan. After all, the twentieth century did not witness wars between two
democracies. And so, democracy might serve as an anti war device,
however a war can save as an anti democracy device. Indeed, Fukuyama writes that
"International Law is merely domestic law writ large". Are we then to
assume that at the end of history, in the foreseeable future, there will be no
need of prisons and all police departments will be shut down? In as much as in
the best and healthiest of societies there will always be "the good guy
and the bad guy", international relation will also, always witness
the good state and the bad state. And not all conflicts will be resolved by The
International Court of Justice in the
Hague , as not all internal conflicts are solved in the
court of law.
Further
more, Nietzsche wrote that "those who have abandoned God cling that much
more firmly to the faith of morality". As long as some states cling to
religious fanaticism, hostile conflicts will continue with those who
"cling... to morality".
Because
an HIV virus does not share any feelings of justice. Leo Strauss wrote to
Alexandre Kojeve, suggesting that wisdom and not merely recognition was
necessary to satisfy man, and that therefore "the end state owes its
privilege to wisdom, to the rule of wisdom, to the popularization of
wisdom...and not to its universality and homogeneity as such".
Fukuyama: ''True freedom
of creativity could arise only out of megalothymia, that is, the
desire to be recognized as better than others...it is also the precondition for
the creation of anything else worth having in life, whether great symphonies,
paintings, novels...''
Are
we to assume that Mozart composed his Operas, concertos, symphonies or masses
"only" to satisfy his megalothymia? With respect we will be
accusing all writers, artists and composers of narrow mindedness. Presuming
that they cared not for society, and cared not for the art in which they were
involved. Shakespeare cared not for literature but for William. Beethoven was not
concerned with music, but with Ludwig, and Rubens might have painting, but made
the efforts to enhance his ego. Or did they? Fukuyama himself writes elsewhere that
"Artists like to convince themselves that they are being socially
responsible in addition to being committed to aesthetic
values".
Fukuyama: ''...history
teaches us that there have been horizons beyond number in the past -
civilizations, religions, ethical codes, "value systems". The people
who lived under them, lacking our modern awareness of history, believed that
their horizon was the only one possible. Those who came late in this process,
those who lived in the old age of mankind, cannot be so uncritical. Modern
education, that universal education that is absolutely crucial in preparing societies
for the modern economic world, liberates men from their attachments to
tradition and authority. They realize that their horizon is merely a horizon,
not solid land but mirage that disappears as one draws closer, giving way to
yet another horizon beyond. That is why modern man is the last man. He
has been jaded by the experience of history, and disabused of the possibility
of direct experience of values.''
The
present generation does "realize" their horizons. And, as in the
past, our horizon is subject to change. The difference between the present
generation and past ones is restricted to the fact that we know our
horizon will be replaced. However, neither we know what will succeed our
horizon, hence our similarities to past generations.
If
the above description of Fukuyama
is an accurate understanding, do we rightfully assume to be "the last
men" just because we expect an unknown replacement to our horizon, although we do not know what will displace
it?
Fukuyama: ''The
last man at the end of history knows better than to risk his life for a
cause, because he recognizes that history was full of pointless battles in
which men fought over whether they should be Christian or Muslim, Protestant or
Catholic, German or French. The loyalties that drove men to desperate acts of
courage and sacrifice were proven by subsequent history to be silly prejudices.
Men with modern educations are content to sit at home, congratulating
themselves on their broad-mindedness and lack of fanaticism.''
Because
of the above, we are not approaching "the end of history".
Nationalism in the Balkan, the conflicts in the ex-USSR, extremism escalating
in Western Europe [Germany, France, or even Spain], Religious extremism in the
Arab World or Iran, conflicts between various tribes all over Africa, should
lead us to conclude that "the end of history" is beyond the horizons.
This
theory contradicts Fukuyama ,
who claims, inter-alia, that if in the future, the world will face destruction,
we will never retreat to a prehistory level because of knowledge stored with
our generation. Yet, according to the
passage just quoted, we will forget and neglect knowledge, which
according to Fukuyama
is an impossibility.
Fukuyama: ''It is in the very design of democratic capitalist
countries like the United States that the most talented and ambitious natures
should tend to go into business rather than into politics, the military,
universities, or the church. And it would seem not entirely a bad thing for the
long-run stability of democratic politics that economic activity can preoccupy
such ambitious natures for an entire lifetime. This is not simply because such
people create wealth which migrates through the economy as a whole, but because
such people are kept out of politics and the military. In those latter
occupations their restlessness would lead them to propose innovations at home
or adventures abroad, with potentially disastrous consequences for the polity.''
American
politics contradict this hypothesis, as - especially in the latter part of the
twentieth century - the political leadership in the USA, more so in government
than in Capitol Hill, is manned by people who were financially successful. It
was assumed that their experience in presiding over a financial empire would
help them in heading a governmental agency or even the presidency.
This
is an underestimation of religion. Even in Modern Western Europe people
maintain religious obligation, which obligations are not contractual, as these
people do believe that these obligations are "underwritten by God".
Human being believes that life offer contractual rights and rights in
rem. He also believes that he has contractual obligations and in rem
obligations. Fukuyama's denial of this presupposition is by itself an
assumption that every believer in God, be he Christian, Muslim, Jewish or Buddhist
believes not in God but in "his self interest".
Animals
do not protect territory? their females whilst exposing themselves to risks?
overcoming fear of death? We do not assume that animals have pride and honor.
Might we not presume that human beings have an animal instinct, but more
developed?
Are
we approaching the end of history? Some of us are looking in the right
direction, some of us do not. Those who do, are faced with foreseeable and
unforeseeable challenges. Yet, "What we call the beginnings are often the
end. And to make an end is to make a beginning. The end is where we start
from".
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