Peace, I hope, with honor.

"PEACE,  I HOPE, WITH HONOR"1

                                                         Shneor Z. [Zalli] Jaffe

A. INTERNAL POLITICS IN ISRAEL

                        The presence of disunity about the method ... among the nation's people, about the rightness of the war aims, makes it impossible for a war of any duration to be fought effectively and won.2

This conclusion, arrived at by the distinguished historian Barbara Tuchman, properly defines the delicate position of the State of Israel. The nation is divided in its approach to security and foreign relations. A single political party cannot entertain a stable majority in the Knesset to ensure political support for policies, subscribed to, by the same party. Moreover, notwithstanding a political party's ability to form a government in partnership with other parties, it is wrong to assume that such a government based on a coalition, ignores the opinion of a distinguished minority in the Knesset.

We should not underestimate Israel's international position. However, most important is unity amongst the people of Israel. The "stability" of the  political map "in the middle" challenges any one of the two leading political parties in their efforts to implement a defined policy. It is the cause of Israel's inability to initiate policies, and the greatest of all political risks facing Israel. Whereas the left suggests "territory for peace"3 the right claims "peace for peace", and Israel is left in the wilderness.

To the above, we must add the following unfortunate consideration. Some citizens of the State of Israel, even elected officials in the Knesset, often fail to appreciate the appropriate norms and limitations in exercising democracy. When a group of politicians wish to challenge a government's policy, lobbying in the Knesset is legal; voting against the government is appropriate; why, even demonstrations must be allowed. Yet, in some instances, Israeli politicians, failing in the above methods, took the liberty of approaching the Oval Office or the Department of State, trying to induce the  latter to embrace a policy, and press the Government of Israel to adopt a similar course, notwithstanding the fact that same scheme was not supported by the majority of  Israelis, as voiced in a general election. This is not a just expression of democracy. Indeed, it is properly a distortion of proper political conduct.  But it exists, in our midst. Members of the labor party "lobbied" against a Likud led government; members of the Likud are trying to compromise the policies adopted by the labor led government.

B. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Israel's international position is vulnerable. Indeed, on the one hand Israel maintains diplomatic relations with more countries than it ever has in its short history [inclusive of countries, never to recognize Israel in the past like The People Republic of China or countries that recognized Israel de facto but not the jure, India.]. On the other hand Israel's unique position as an ally will deteriorate, as the cold war and the superpowers' tension crashed to point zero. The superpowers' interests in supporting states around the globe is declining. The division of the world into influenced zones which was imposed after the second world war has come to an end. The world should be facing international peace4.  Even the war in the gulf did not challenge the basic of the euphoria. We should not underestimate the danger of the tensions in the Baltic or the new commonwealth. Neither should we ignore the tension in some parts of the third world. We must therefore try and solve the conflict in the Middle East and deviate attentions to the tension in other parts of the world.

Moreover, delaying peace process in the Middle East will by itself, become an incentive to hostile Arab rulers to attract non conventional armament experts who became unemployed in the ex-USSR.  In addition, members in what was the Warsaw Pact, inclusive of the former Soviet Union might be encouraged to sell their available non conventional armaments with the hope of contributing to those countries shattered economies.  In other words, the answer to the question Who is the mideast Pillar? analyzed by George Will5 will not be as vital in the future as it was in the past.

In addition, attention should be paid to the growing gap within the Jewish Communities around the world. The Bush administration in Washington, succeeded in establishing a wedge within the American Jewish community. The latter does not constantly unite behind the State of Israel. The deeper the gap within the Jewish community in the USA, the weaker Israel's position is in Washington. Paul Kennedy, in his brilliant book The Rise and fall of the Great powers, when referring to the USA-Israeli "special" relations, writes, inter alia, "towards which, a powerfully organized domestic lobby presses for unflinching support for an isolated but militarily efficient Israel"6. It seems that this "domestic lobby" will not be as influential in the future  as it was in the past.  Consequently, the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem will deteriorate to the point, familiar to the Israelis, when searching for the junction of the French-Israeli relation, in the days, prior to the 1967 Six Days War. In any event these relationships limited Israel's liberty to conduct foreign policy to the best of its judgment6A. The euphoria developed due to the war in the Gulf ended shortly after the termination of hostilities. Relation improved only when President George Bush's Presidential  election campaign took an alarming dive. Indeed, the change of government in Israel helped Israel's image7, but this should not be looked upon as a new wave. Israel is yet to face more pressure as soon as Washington will settle down back to business. Prime Minister Shamir was not the first Israeli prime Minister to be challenged by American pressure. Prime Minister's Rabin relation with President Ford new very hostile moments.

In gross variance to the policies adopted by previous governments in Israel, Prime Minister Rabin's government has taken a new, totally unfamiliar venue. A daring policy, necessitating the adoption of unpopular moves and revoking promises made to the most dedicated of supporters. Such unfamiliar venues which consequences are always irreversible are to be researched carefully. Indeed, the warnings of Paul Johnson should be brought to the attention of the Israeli leadership.  Mr. Johonson

writes;

                        When we are working on a problem, in science or anything else, we form a hypothesis and then endeavor to verify it empirically. Human nature being what it is, if the hypothesis is exciting in embodying a new and important truth, or if it accords with our preconceived ideas, we tend to look eagerly for evidence which supports it, and to ignore or brush aside evidence which doesn't fit. Worse still, if negative evidence thrusts itself on us, we brazenly modify the theory to accommodate it, instead of bravely admitting the hypothesis is false and starting all over again7A

Moreover; he who does not remember the past is condemned to repeat it. In his book, Hitler and Stalin, Parallel lives8, Alan Bullock  analyses the policies adopted by the United States and Great Britain in regard to Russia. Notwithstanding the fact that the Second World War would have been a different war, if not for the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, Stalin led the Western powers to agree to the division of Europe. Poland - because of whom, England and France declared war on Germany, and on whose account the above mentioned agreement was signed, was left to become a Russian satellite. Stalin succeeded where Hitler failed.  Lord Bullock writes, inter alia,

                        This [forming Popular  Democratic Fronts - SZJ] was soon extended to East Germany as the German Democratic Republic, and for the next forty years, punctuated by the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the Czech of 1968, Central and Eastern Europe was governed by satellite regimes of the Soviet Union, a Stalinist order in place of the earlier, imposed on them by Hitler and the Nazis.8A

Henry Kissinger explains.

                        Stalin possessed no conceptual apparatus to enable him to forgo territory on behalf of goodwill, or "objective" reality for the mood of the moment. Therefore, he was bound to propose to his democratic Allies the same arrangements that he asked Hitler a year earlier ... [Stalin] would take from each temporary partner whatever was possible through diplomacy, and seize by force whatever had not been granted to him freely - as long as he could do so without risking war8B

Josef Stalin

The above, with the West acquiescence and blessing. Indeed, England surrendered Poland to Soviet rule notwithstanding the fact that His majesty's government knew that Poland will suffer as much under the red army as it did under the Wehrmacht. Indeed Churchill acknowledged that the German revelations about the mass murder of 5,000 Polish officers by the Russians in Katyn in the spring of 1943 were true8C. He was even discussing with Stalin the latter's undertakings to keep Poland a democracy9 .

The United States and England proved to lack proper foreign policy. They succeeded when military operations was the instrument [Germany] and failed when diplomacy was called for [Russia]. Indeed, Maksim Litvinov who served as USSR's foreign minister before Vyacheslav Molotov told reporters [in 1944] that ''Stalin had imperial designs on Eastern Europe and wondered aloud why the West did not intervene"9A This, notwithstanding the fact that Churchill "never put [Katyn] out of his mind"9A1.

                        [Anthony] Eden has received harsh treatment from historians, but he had a keener eye than Churchill when it came to seeing into the future. In 1941 he warned that at the end of the war the Soviet would want to keep their gains from their pact with Hitler, and that since their armies would have played the major part in defeating the Nazis, they would be in a position to take what they wanted; all the western allies could do was to acquiesce now, in the hope if restraining Soviet appetite later. As early as this it was clear that appeasement of the Germans would be followed by appeasement of the Soviet Union.9A2

 Stalin demonstrated his intentions in Potsdam, where Truman and Churchill surrounded Poland to the USSR in consideration for unkept promises. Inter alia, "once again free elections for Poland were promised for the immediate future [by Stalin - SZJ] but not then held9B" Whereas President Truman failed to challenge the task of Soviet hegemony, his predecessor refused to recognize its potential threat.

                        He Rejected the idea that a total defeat of Germany might create a vacuum, which victorious Soviet Union might then try to fill9C

Amazing as it may sound, this phenomenal scheme was repeated through the pages of the twentieth century.

The agreement with Stalin was indeed humiliating.

                        A formal agreement on the mutual repatriation of Soviet and American solders and civilians was drawn up and signed at Yalta in February 1945. Although nothing in the agreement required American and British commanders to forcibly repatriate Soviet citizens against their will, the Soviet insisted on it and the Western allies complied, shipping trainload after trainload of former prisoners of war back to the Soviet Union. A special organization for repatriation of Soviet prisoners had been set up under the Sovnarkom ...9D

These prisoners became Stalin's prisoners upon their return to the Sovuet union.

Korea10. Barbara Tuchman11 elaborated on Mao Zedong's and Zhou Enlai's request to come to Washington in order to negotiate an agreement with the USA. The request was held back by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. "one of the big 'ifs'"12 was what would have happened, if "the massage had been duly forwarded to the 'highest officials'"13. Mrs Tuchman concludes that

                        ''It is conceivable that there might have been no Korean War"14.

Indeed, contrary to US's understanding

                        We  know today that soon after winning its civil war, Communist China came to consider the Soviet Union as the most serious threat to its independence14A.

Cuba15.  The USA had a "clear" one sided policy in regard to Cuba, as Gaddis Smith writes;

                        Although keeping Cuba out of the hands of a strong and hostile power was one of the oldest objectives of American foreign policy15A.

The US failed to defend its policy. Why, it was President Eisenhower who - anticipating a Cuban crisis "responded by invoking the Monroe Doctrine and asserting that the United States would not 'permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere'"15B.  The mismanagement of the Cuban crisis was noticeable immediately.  "Robert [Kennedy] told his press aid Edwin Guthman 'I think we've made a hell of a mistake.  Guthman asked if there was anything he could do.  Kennedy said 'you can start praying for those fellows on ther beach"15B1.  Indeed, in summarizing the Cuban Crises,  Paul Johnson was harsher.  He wrote that "President kennedy handling of Cuba, suggested an imperfect understanding of America's vital interests and failure to distinguish between image and reality"15C.   Indeed, sp outragious was President kennedy's handling of the  crisis, that after welcoming Algerian's strong man, Ahamad Ben Bella in Washingtom and having "what the president had thought was an amaible conversation in the oval office, Ben Bella had confirmed Kennedy's private prejudices about the opportunism of nonaligne leaders by flying straight to Havana and joining Castro to demend that the United States abandon the ninety-nine-year lease to its Guantanamo naval base on the island"15D 

Suez/Hungary.  When President Nasser blocked the Suez Canal, the USA opposed to any

military response. US policy was expressed by Secretary of State John Foster Dullas was convinced that moral persuasion would convince Nasser. Moreover, "The dallas brothers wanted Nasser 'in place' because on the basis of intelligence acquired by the CIA in Cairo, he was thought in no way to threaten the one overriding US interest in the Middle East - access to cheap crude from Iran and Saudi Arabia"16 He therefore proposed the London Maritime Conference, explaining, inter alia that

                        [Most people] ... pay decent respect for the opinion of mankind ... and because I believe that, I am confident that out of this conference there will come a judgement of such moral force that we can be confident that the Suez Canal will go on, as it has for the last 100 years, for the years in the future to serve in peace the interests of mankind16A

Winston Churchill disagreed. "I do not care for the look of things in the Middle East" he wrote in September of 1957, adding,

                        By their action in Suez the Americans have put an end to the chance of using anything  but words and money, and they are not always enough16A1.

Indeed, Nasser never came to London. US Pressure on England, France and Israel offered Nasser a moral victory, which victory helped him establish his position as the leader of the Arab World.

Parallel to the Suez crises the world had to attend to a crises closer to NATO; the Soviet invasion to Hungary. While the USA helped Soviet's allay and "promoted" Soviet interests in the Middle East it also helped Soviet aggression in Europe by disengaging both issues. 

                        [The United States] could and should, have linked its condemnation of British and French actions with condemnation of Soviet actions in Hungary. By acting as if the Suez issue were entirely moral and legal, and as if it had no geopolitical basis, the United States evaded the reality that an unconditional victory for Nasser - an outcome in which Egypt gave no guarantees with respect to the operation of the Canal - was also a victory for a radical policy encouraged by Soviet arms and sustained by Soviet threats.16B

In 1956, many Soviet troops arriving in Budapest to crush the Hungarian uprising imagined that the Danube was the Suez Canal, and that they were there to fight the British and french forces which had landed in Port Said16B1.

Berlin US's policy regarding the Berlin Wall not only failed to unite US's allies in Europe -as De Gaulle tried to attract West Germany to adopt a French Oriented policy, in variance to American oriented policy - Germany itself disagreed with US policy in Berlin but to no avail.  "At Camp David Eisenhower told Khushchev that America had no intention of staying in Berlin for ever".16C American then thoughts that Khushchev understood the peaceful approach of the US.16D USSR's response was not delayed. on 13th August, 1961 West Berlin was barbed wired, westerners and easterners found themselves on both sides of barricades.

The USA gave in. Henrey Kissinger quotes from an Administration leak which stated

                        An authoritative United States source called on West Germany today to accept in its own interests the "reality" of the existence of two German states.16E 

Konrad Adenauer lost confidence in US credibility16F.                                     

And justly so. Why, Truman was not of one mind regarding the Soviets. "He had no clear policy or long range objectives. He was facing events only as they came ...16G"

Truman tried to maintain balance, alas did not impress Stalin who declared on 9th February, 1946 "that communism and capitalism were incompatible and that another war was inevitable"16H.

Vietnam, where a generation long war melted in diplomacy. The Paris peace treaty orchestrated by Henry Kissinger did not help save the South from annihilation17. The war in Vietnam demonstrated that the US failed to learn from its own mistakes. Barbara Tuchman writes;

                        Yet we repeat the pattern. An architect of our involvement in Vietnam, Mr. Walt Rostow, insists that a fundamental premise of american policy is the establishment of a stable balance of power in Asia. This is not a condition the West can establish".18

As whenever The USA is challenged by an aggressor, so, in Vietnam many had undertaken to see to it that Hanoi faces the consequences of her aggression. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk told the American Society of International Law, [referring to Vietnam] that "Surely we must have learned after three decades that the acceptance of aggression leads only to a sure catastrophe. Surely we have learned that the aggressor must face the consequences of his actions"18A. Indeed? Amazing as it may sound, USA "lost" Vietnam in a similar manner to the French defeat. "United Action could no longer save Dien Bien Phu, which fell on May 7 even as diplomats were discussing Indochina in Geneva18B. The bewilderment in US approach to Vietnam had reach unprecedented diplomatic activities. As Henrey Kissinger writes;

                        I know of no other instance in diplomatic history of a nation guaranteeing a settlement  it has refused to signed, and about which it has expressed such strong reservations18C.

Kissinger summarizes:  the error in the following formula.

                        The nightmare of Vietnam was not the way in which America entered the war, but why it did so without a more careful assessment of the likely costs and potential outcomes18D.

The concequents of Vietnam was traumatic and indeed had a political price. "Exploiting America's post-Vietnam trauma, the Kremlin sent proxy forces to Africa and its own troops into Afghanistan"18E.

"The Shah is a rock of stability" declared President Jimmy Carter on his last visit to Tehran.  Indeed, the president persuaded the congress to approve massive arms sales [inclusive of AWACS - the flying radars]19. Not only did the same president fail to save this important ally, he even refused to allow Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi entry to the United States, but for and only during medical treatment20.

The embassy crises in Teheran. To add insult into injury, the United States will compensate Iran for ammunition, purchased by the latter but not delivered further to the revolution21. The United States was diplomatic and gained nothing. The Mullahs have won in every aspect.  They humiliated America, they were never punished, but on the contrary, they are to be compensated. By the way, was the timing of compensation a coincidence? or is there a reason for this announcement to be made when Western hostages were released from Lebanon?

The diplomatic efforts initiated by the United States to avert the war between England and the Argentine bore no fruits. Indeed, Alexander Haig cannot assess his efforts to mediate between London and Buenos Aires, as his finest hour22.

In Grenada, military force served as the method of negotiation. That is the cause of US's mastery. Diplomacy was not tried, as the eight hundred Americans in the Island faced a grave risk. And so, the president of the United States assumed that "there was only one answer"23, this, notwithstanding outrage in 10 Dawning Street.24

The United States won[?] a war against Iraq on behalf of Kuwait, however failed to see the similarities between Iraq Vs. Kuwait and Syria Vs. Lebanon. Saddam Hussein used military force, and - like Hitler before him failed to achieve his aim [alas, unlike Hitler, he survived].  Haffez-el-Assad, utilized diplomacy and like Stalin, he gained the upper hand24A.

Indeed, let us compare two leaders, and US approach to them. Manuel Noriega was ousted militarily, taken from his own country, by force, and put in jail in Miami, all for drug trafficking. Assad's involvement in the same business is no less destructive and involves no less amount of dollars and cents. Yet, the United States is contemplating "taking Syria's name off the list" of drug supporting countries, or of terrorist supporting countries, against all odds.  Indeed, Alan Bullock points to a conclusion arrived at, by Hitler "from his Viennese days. ... One was, the ease with which the masses could be manipulated by skillful propaganda"25  Assad has a better understanding. World leaders can also be misled.

Many dispute the glory of Desert Storm, and its conclusions. After all, Saddam Hussein is still in power26, and the sufferings inflicted on the Iraqi people are not usually taken into consideration in Baghdad, unless such misfortunes challenge the stability of the reign. In an interview to the Newsweek, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, the commander of the British Forces in Operation Desert Storm, remarked, inter alia, that "the only question I would raise, is whether we should have demanded more out of the peace discussion with Iraqi military leaders. But that is a political question. I have got my own views, but I am getting out of my depth, and we'd better keep off of it"27. Indeed, in his Autobiography, published in 1994, Sir Peter "admited" that the bring down of the Iraqi president, was the prime objective of Dessert Storm, which objective, the allied failed to meet27A. President Bush  was more direct when he said "I miscalculated but I was not alone"27B.

The administration in Washington did not anticipate the gathering storm. On January 14th, 1990, President Bush reaffirmed the administration's desire to seek expended trade with Iraq. A senior administration official commented that "we knew what he was, he wasn't an altar boy. We thought, rightly or wrongly, that it was better to engage than not"28. Muhammad H. Heikel defined the level of Western understanding in the following manner. "The most surprising aspect of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was that it was a surprise"29 A title of the book, published by the US News and World Report reveals it all. Triumph Without Victory. US forces had triumph. US diplomacy lost the victory. Why, even experienced US politicians were blinded by Saddam's charm, as was so characteristically demonstrated by Senator Robert Doll, during his bizarre visit to Iraq, on 12th April, 1991, or the condemnations by the Senator and his colleagues of the Voice of America, when the latter expressed its opinion of the Iraqi President.30 

To add insult into injury, the Arab World did not support additional military operations against Iraq, neither did they permit any military sanctions against Libya, for failing to abide by the United Nations' resolution, regarding the extradition of its two agents responsible for the Lockerbie tragedy. After all, the Arab states found themselves disillusioned with Desert Storm's results31.

A criteria of victory should include the enemy's inability at the termination of hostility to act in a manner similar to his conduct that brought about the collisions. At least for a reasonable period of time. This was not the case with Iraq. October 1994 witnesses Iraq's challenge to the world once again. Although it withdrew, its ability to compromise the stability of the Persian Gulf should not be taken for granted, or as the Newsweek defined the problem  "But what about the next time?"31A.

The United States failed to evaluate its own mistakes in regard to Iraq32, as is reflected in the administration coining with the same mistakes with regard to Syria. Of all Syrian's official, the Secretary of State and the head of the CIA hosted in Washington, non other but the General Razi Cna'an. General Cna'an was the uncrowned king of Beirut, and is heavily involved - personally and on behalf of President Assad and his brother Rifat, in the multi million Dollars Drug trafficking from Lebanon33. The US has learnt the hard way of its mistakes regarding Iraq; It will be much more difficult and embarrassing, in regard to Syria.

How determined was the West in regard to Iraq.  Bosnia, having no petroleum to its name did not receive the same support. NATO officials admitted they were powerless to halt Serb Advance33A. Indeed, Senator Robert Dole calls the Bosnian War a classic failure to NATO33B. How can a mighty NATO explain the humiliating defeat to a small and primitive army in Bosnia. Simply with the truth. Total lack of interest. And if Muslims have to be genocides, so be it.  What a compliment. In the first time NATO was called to its real duty, protecting Europe, NATO, inclusive of the USA did not meet its obligations.

James Baker sat in Paris around the same table with representatives of the Khmer Rouge, and thus recognized the validity and legality of the Nazis of the Far East. The latter did not reciprocate the diplomatic gesture. The peace negotiations regarding Cambodia are facing a collapse, as the Khmer Rouge will not surrender its armaments.34

American's inconsistency and inability to maintain a principle was demonstrated once again when having to attend to the question of renewing China's most-favored nation trading privileges in May of 1994. In May 1993, President Bill Clinton undertook not to renew the same privileges. Mr. Clinton criticized President George Bush for ignoring China's human rights record; for being 'soft on tyrants'. In May of 1994, President Clinton decided that China will benefit from same privileges. This notwithstanding the fact that "China's human rights record has deteriorated still further"34A.

Indeed, President Woodrow Wilson declared in a speech at Mount Vernon, on 4th July, 1918, that the Allied had four main aims, the third of which was that "national morality to be like individual morality"34B or, as explained by Henrey kissinger; "Foreign policy should reflect the same moral standards as personal ethics"34B1.

Russia's recent approach to Abkhazia, the deployments of troops in variance to its international undertakings (and to its newly adopted constitution - for that matter); it declarations that Russian troops will "forever" stay in Tajikistan. The editor of The Spectator  compares the West's attitude to Russia's behavior in Eastern Europe today to its attitude to Stalin's conduct after the Second World War "when the western powers granted Stalin  the control of eastern Europe on the understanding that democracy would be respected there"34C"

Indeed "The Cold War" is over. Yet, did the US win the cold war or is it because "they [The Russians - SZJ] failed to make good on their promises"34D.

Worse still. The United states of America commanded some of the most generous operations in world history. The greatest of them all are Marshal Plan in Europe [this, notwithstanding President Roosevelt declared policy not to do so34E] and its parallel in Japan named after the American Ceasar35. Marshal Plan contributed to West European countries' decision to join NATO. However, the United states failed to guarantee the continuity of membership in NATO, if any member state resolved to withdraw. IN explaining France's determination to annul its membership in the organization, President De Gaulle said :".. my aim then was to disengage France ... from the integration realized by NATO under American command"36.

Neither America's support granted to post 1945 Japan justify itself economically.

                        The Greatest foreign "victim" of Japanese business practices, at least measured by the decibels of complaints, is the United States, which in recent years has experienced annual merchandise trade deficits with Japan of as  much as $40 to $50 billion, has seen some of its key industries eclipsed by Japanese competition and has reacted with growing concern as Japan has brought up ever more American assets.  This is not only a massive historic irony that the American post- 1945 occupation encouraged Japan to abandon "militarism" in favor of peaceful commercial pursuit, but a  contemporary political irony, since the United States provides strategic security to all an ally that contributes much less to the common defense while eroding America's own industrial base37.

I do not believe we will be too harsh on American foreign policy if we conclude this chapter with the words  Mr. Angelo Codevilla who writes that "the United States has been surprised be every major world event since 1960"38.  The reason being that

                        basic to the conduct of foreign policy, is the problem basic to all policy; how to apply wisdom to government.  If wisdom to government eludes us, perhaps courage could substitute - the moral courage to terminate mistakes"39

A short summary of American foreign policy in the twentieth century was offered by David Fromkin who wrote

                                                As Americans traveled through the twentieth century, they often were to find themselves voyaging in foreign waters seeking in all sincerity and with the best of intentions to do good - and yet somehow appearing foolish, or worst39A

If the United States will initiate peace proposals in the Middle East, its efficiency will parallel past initiatives, in other parts of the world. Israel might find itself like Poland after the Second World War or comparable to Vietnam after the Paris Peace Treaty, simply, because the United States is "surprised by every major world event". In other words, The US does not know any better. Israel, must therefore initiate a detailed peace plan, and not leave it to other to draft a scheme for it.

Henry Kissinger writes:

                        The study of history offers no manual instructions that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations.  But each generation must determine for itself which circumstances are in fact comparable39A1.

Israel should learn from history, and draw the conclusions that it should not rely on US initiatives. Moreover, if others will initiate peace plans for Israel, such plans will have to be guaranteed by third parties. Many political analysts will verify that states "cannot rely on international agreements alone or on international organizations like the United Nations"40

C.        POLITICAL ANTICIPATIONS

In the future, the world will witness a decreasing number of military conflicts. This, notwithstanding the remarkable number of confrontations presently being fought in Europe, the new commonwealth, and other parts of the Third World. Governments - inclusive of, or primarily, that of the United states - will cut down their military budgets.  If the Middle East ignores the new waive; if Israel remain a center, surrounded by hostile neighbors, we perhaps could predict the following.

            A.        Israel's position as a strategic asset, decreasing in any event41, will be altered to that of a nuisance.

            B.        Whilst other countries will concentrate on advancement in science, technology, culture and academia in numerous fields, Israel will have to maintain its foremost concentration on military developments, with a decreasing international marketability42.

            C.        In case of war, the people of Israel will be called upon to overcome disputes and unite. Presently, this is not a simple task. Wars no longer unite the Israelis. The unfortunate conclusions of the 1982 War in Lebanon were not founded on IDF's inability to fight, but on the internal political disputes associated with the hostilities. Zahal can attend to the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails and even grenades and shootings in the West Bank or Gaza. It cannot, and, for that matter, should not overcome the disagreements in Israel in regard to the Intifada. Unity, pursued at the outset of Desert Storm was short lived, and did not even witness the conclusion of hostilities in the Gulf. If Israel faces a war, who will guarantee the decreasing of conflicts and achievement of unity?

It is perhaps accurate to conclude this paragraph with the observation of the Roman Historian Crispus C. Sallustius who characterized the achievement of the Roman Republic.

                        And in time of war and peace, they used to emphasize on the good.  Mostly, unity was within them and very little greediness.   Law and justice was stable within them, rooted on nature more then on laws. Fights, disputes and hostilities were dedicated to enemies.  Citizens  competed with one another on spirituality.  The worship of the gods they exercised generously; in their household savings; with their friends belief.  With these two categories, daring in time of war and justice in time of peace, they have calculated their own business and the business of state"43.

D. WEST BANK AND GAZA

The political atmosphere in the West Bank and Gaza is complicated. There are hostile and violent disputes between rival political and military groups. The PLO itself is a coalition within a coalition, challenged by the Hammas and others. Those activists loyal to King Hussein, although presently in hiding, did not vanish. A unique phenomenon in this situation is the fact that any group - as small as it might be - gains international publicity, by using the mechanism of the debating society Palestinian version, i.e. knives, guns, and the strangling of victims. The only principle uniting these groups - and many Arab countries, for that matter - is Israel and hostility towards it.

The wholehearted support, offered by some Palestinian elements, including all groups associated with the PLO to Iraq during the latter's invasion of Kuwait, caused a serious rift between the PLO and the more important Arab countries - which rift is slowly being bridged again in some countries. Not on many other occasions was Senator Henry Jackson dictum proven right, when he said "I believe that it is both wrong and foolhardy for any democratic state to consider international terrorism to be 'someone else's problem"43A.  Indeed, on 19th January, 1991, the government in Riyadh condemned the PLO in unqualified and unprecedented language. The hostility between the PLO and Syria failed to meet its conclusion, and until now, even King Hussein's efforts to rehabilitate his name in Riyadh bore no fruits.

If Israel surrenders the administration of the West Bank and Gaza to the competing elements within the PLO or the Hammas, the area will withdraw to the usual Arab vehicle of rationalization as we witness continuously. The government of Iraq did not hesitate to use  mustard gas against Iraqi citizens of Kurdish origin. Syria annihilated the city of Hamma where the inhabitants belong to a sect of Islam different to the sect identified with Haffaz-el-Assad and his cronies in Damascus. Christians are fighting for survival in Sudan;  why, even believers in the Coptic Church in Egypt are exposed to violence43B; the Christian residents of Bethlehem are vacating the city, fearing their Muslim neighbors.

The Palestinian sects active in the conflict with Israel do not use different methods. The Intifada witnessed more Arab victims of Arab violence then victims to Israeli ammunition.  Lebanon is the prime product of Palestinian's intervention in another country. Lebanon, being the second prototype. The first precedent occurred in Black September of 1970, in Jordan.

E. PEACE PLAN

Until recently, Israel has had to concentrate on the rejections of plans initiated by others.  Currently, Israel demonstrates more flexibility, yet not with self initiatives but by accepting third parties ideas, which ideas are disputed by a large minority in Israel. We will not be able to oppose plans ad infinitum, as the international strength of Israel as a strategic asset is declining. Israel is to offer the positive, not to negate the negative. Alas, some rules must be considered when a peace initiative is initiated.

i           "As a general rule, countries striving for stability and equilibrium should do everything within their power to achieve their basic peace terms while still at war.  As long as the enemy is in the field, his strength indirectly enhances that of the more peaceful side. if this principle is neglected and the key issues are left unresolved until the peace conference, the most determined power ends up in possession of the prizes and can be dislodged only by a major confrontation43C.

ii          "There are some experiments in diplomacy which cannot be tried because failure invites irreversible risk43D".

iii         "The thing that is to be supported and the force that is to support it should stand in geometrical proportion to each other43E"

iv         ''Calculations of costs and benefits in a democracy, differ from those in any dictatorship.''

v          ''Dictatorship has more control over hostile public opinion whereas leaders elected in a democracy are constantly challenged by public opinion.''

vi         ''To remember that "foreign policy often involves deciding among imperfect choices"43F.

vii        ''A democracy should take measure against a totalitarian regime's ability to ploy with domestic public opinion in same democracy''43G.

viii       ''A democracy cannot conduct a serious foreign policy if the contending factions within it do not exercise a minimum of restraint toward each other"43H.

ix         Diplomacy is a chase game. "one elementary lesson for students of chess is that, in choosing among moves, one can do worse then to count the number of squares dominated by each choice. generally, the more squares a player dominates, the greater his options and the more constrained become those of his opponent.  Similarly, in diplomacy, the more options one side has, the fewer will be available to the other side and the more careful it will have to be in pursuing its objectives.  Indeed, such a state of affairs may in time provide an incentive for the adversary to seek to end his adversarial role"43I.

F.         THE SOLUTION

Israelis are, therefore, called upon to compromise. To introduce a peace plan acceptable to the vast majority of the people of Israel. Where Israel will be united, none will be able to contest it. Towards this aim, both Labor and Likud will have to adjust principles; their contributions towards the unity of the nation. The alternative will be that 'others will do it for us.' All in Israel agree to a stronger Israel with less ideology, then to more ideology, but Jerusalem as the capital city of Palestine. The reader is familiar with the majority of the elements outlined herein below. After all, as John Locke wrote "New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason, but because they are not already common"44.

I.         Palestinian Entity

Israel should agree presently  - before being forced to do so - to the creation of a Palestinian entity, in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed the Government of Israel recognised an entity, yet denying the obvious consequence that such entity is "A Palestinian ... State in all but in name"44A. It is true that until recently, all senior officials in Israel refused to consider such a possibility.  This is as true with Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meyer, Moshe Dayan and Yigal Alon, all members of the Labor party. However, King Hussein's declared policy of withdrawing interests in the West Bank, and the endorsement by Arab residents in the area of a Palestinian identity, lead us presently to conclude that there is no other way.

The Palestinian entity should be "armyless" but might maintain a restricted police force. The entity should not be allowed to host foreign troops.

II.         Jewish Settlements

The large Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza - inclusive of the Tomb of Rachel will remain Israeli territory; their residents being Israeli citizens for every purpose. defined roads in the West Bank and Gaza, leading to the settlements, although Palestinian territory, will host Israelis and those coming from Israel without restrictions or the necessity to carry a passport or a pass. Small and temporary communities will merge with the large settlements.

The settlements will be connected to electricity, telephone and water installations of Israel.  The settlers will have the right to restore and develop said infrastructure.

The settlements will maintain security measures, inclusive of Israeli police force.

III.        Tomb of Patriarch

The tomb of the Patriarch is in the center of an Arab city - Hebron. We suggest that the arrangements presently realized regarding the exercises of the Jewish and Muslim religions will be maintained. A road leading to the cave will be available to Israelis. The status of the road will correspond to roads leading to the settlements as mentioned herein above.

Tomb of Patriarch - Hebron

IV.      Jerusalem

United Jerusalem should remain the capital city of Israel. Yet, with all due respect, the Arab residents of East Jerusalem should not be required to become Israeli citizens, as such a policy will impose a dangerous topographical challenge. The Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem should hold Palestinian Passports and are to be considered foreign residents. In a sense, their status will correspond to that of the Arab residents of the West Bank in the autonomy plan, initiated by the Late Prime Minister Menachem Begin. An equivalent status is endured by many Jews residing in Jerusalem as tourists [hospitium publicum]. Naturally, consideration must be given to the financial activities [work, etc.] of those residing in Jerusalem. They will be subject to Israeli law [like any resident, notwithstanding his citizenship], they will pay income tax and municipal tax. Israel will treat these residents like residents of any other country.

All holy places and shrines will be subject to Israeli jurisdiction and domination. However,  the Government of Israel should allow a Muslim entity to administrate the Muslim shrines [as is presently the modus vivendi in both Muslim and Christian religions], which entity should not entertain any political considerations.

Temple Mount - Jerusalem

V.       The Refugees

The participation of the dwellers of the refugees camps in the Intifada is rooted, inter alia in the philosophy reading we have nothing to lose44B. The refugees do not have to work [UNWRA will support them in any event]; the dwelling conditions are beyond any reasonable standard; education offered to their children, poor. President Gamal Abdul Nasser appreciated the danger of this situation. "The refugees, said Nasser, are a time bomb that will destroy Israel from within"45. The problem, however, does not affect Israel's rule, but any rule of any law. Indeed, by 17th July, 1994, Gaza was semi independent. The Palestinian flag was the formal and legal flag, the Israeli solder was replaced by a Palestinian policeman, and "Abu Amar" moved his formal residence from Tunis to Gaza. This did not prevent the chaos in the early hours of 17th July, 1994 [which chaos was enhanced by Hammas activists], which chaos was caused by hunger, by the fact that unemployment in Gaza reaches a level of 45 per-cent45A. National independence will not cure the problem, a flag cannot bring bred or water, a uniform cannot educate.

Proportionately speaking, Gaza is the most populated area in the world. Paul Kennedy writes about Egypt that "If [it] collapses under a growing population and a shrinking land base, the repercussions - political and military, as well as social - could greatly affect its neighbors in Israel and Europe"46. Gaza represents a similar threat. President Anwar a-Sadat of Egypt did not demand the restoration of Gaza to Egypt when negotiating the peace terms with Israel, as he appreciated the danger involved in administrating this area. Alas, Gaza can shake the stability of Israel, Egypt, and so Europe. 

The rehabilitation of the refugee camps, should therefore be the prime subject.This operation cannot be orchestrated by Israel, as the various political groups, presently operating in the West Bank, will encourage the denial of any help offered by the Zionists.  On the other hand, neither can this enterprise be entrusted with any of the entities momentarily operating in the area, be it the PLO, Hammas, or the elders of the villages, as same trust will invoke violent rivalries. Contributing to the financial strength of any of the sects will escalate political tension, which means, shedding blood. The same rationality leads us to conclude that the rehabilitation program cannot be executed by Jordan or Syria.  We believe, that the endeavor be delegated to Saudi Arabia. The latter has no direct political aspirations in the area, however, has unique religious and financial influence.  Moreover, Saudi Arabia will be expected to contribute financially to the rehabilitation program47. The refugees will benefit with improved dwelling conditions in the present locations of their respective camps. A family wishing to depart from the camp should have the right to receive from the state a plot of land for no financial consideration.  On the same plot, the family will build its new residence, subsidized by the Peace Fund.  All contributors will demonstrate their good will only within the atmosphere of peace. "as peace [is] the first condition of prosperity"48.

We anticipate a development in commercial activities, more available jobs and the escalation of standard of education.

In the new environment, the refugees' interest in violence will decrease, they will be less  attracted to participate in turbulent demonstrations, will avoid the Molotov Cocktail and stones, will not expose themselves to Israeli ammunition as they will have what to lose49.

This policy will compromise the rule of terror, presently being utilized in the area. The moderates will come out to the light of day and the support of extremism will lessen. After all the violence of neither Hammas nor the PLO can survive without at least the passive support - many a times out of fear -  of the residents of the area.

In the new atmosphere, the political endeavor may proceed; i.e. organizing the election, systemize jurisdiction and the creation of a stable entity which will not be feared by its neighbors. If we may paraphrase the observation of the German writer Von Hornigk "whether a nation today can live in peace, depends not on the security of its power, but principally on whether its neighbors posses more or less of it"50.

The financial endeavor is not beyond mastery. It is our assumption that it will not exceed two billions Dollars51. This is a sound investment, moderate in relation to any military budget of any country in the region. A Peace Fund should be formed, to which various countries  will contribute their respective shares. The Peace Fund's sole objective will be the implementation of the rehabilitation program.

VI. Incentives to Saudi Arabia

Israel can attract Saudi Arabia's participation in the rehabilitation program with the following consideration.

The Royal family of Saud is entrusted with the governorship of the two holiest monuments for Islam; Mecca and Medina. All can appreciate Riyadh's ambition to dominate the shrine on Temple Mount [the third holiest  site for all of Muhammad's followers. On the other hand, Israel will not compromise its jurisdiction over the whole city of Jerusalem. However, the Government of Israel might agree to convert the Temple Mount to an area with a status similar to that of an embassy, benefiting Saudi Arabia. The Government in Riyadh, can then  accept the undertaking as the supervisor responsible for the all Islam holy shrines in the city of Jerusalem52.

Such a formula will not deny Israel its territorial claims to the city of Jerusalem; yet, The House of Saud will retain control of the Temple Mount, as if the latter was a Saudi Embassy. Such a formula will enable the Royal Family in Riyadh to govern all three holiest Islamic sanctuaries, a long standing desire of that family.

VII.     Election

It has to be fully understood that free democratic elections in the West Bank and Gaza is a prerequisite and mandatory precondition, prior to which, no party may claim to represent the Palestinians.

Election can only materialize after a period of stability. This, in order to enable all potential candidates to stand for election without fearing for their lives.

VIII.     PLO

One of the more crucial questions in this scheme is the status of the PLO. It is true that the real PLO53 was exposed once again for all to witness, when the latter continuously and unconditionally supported Saddam Hussein during the crises in the Gulf. The world should remember this party when its position is to be defined in any peace plan. Abba Eban once said of this organization "The PLO never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity"54.   The PLO was the greatest power behind world terrorism in the history of man kind. As Julian Baker once stated "To speak about international terrorism without mentioning the PLO is like speaking of the blood circulation without mentioning the heart". The PLO "invented" the war against the airline passengers, against innocent bystanders, shoppers and school children. The PLO record in international terrorism, its demonstration of support to Iraq and its abuse to international law, does not qualify it as an entity to be received as an equal partner in the international community. Indeed, Secretary of State, James Baker, when testifying to the Foreign Relation Committee of the US Senate on 7th February, 1991, stated that "the PLO... in supporting Saddam Hussein, made the wrong choice". And so, according to John Bollach and Harvey Morris55 confirmed that Washington also "decided that no matter what happened, the old guard of the PLO would never again be a party to negotiation".  According to the Economist56 the Palestinians themselves were approaching similar conclusions regarding Yassir Arafat. In as much as the USA "forgave" the Khmer Rouge57, they also "forgave" the PLO for the latter's contribution to the shedding of so much innocent American blood, for supporting all the wrong elements in international politics. Be it the Chinese leadership further to the Tianamnmen Square massacre; Iran, during the US Embassy crises; Libya; or the "Arab Dr. No"58. The PLO does not have to be, and should not be a crucial player in this juncture. This, notwithstanding the assumed support to the PLO within the West Bank and Gaza, which support cannot be challenged for fear of death.

It is true that Israel made peace with Germany after the Second World War. The first German ambassador to Israel to present his credentials to President Zalman Shazar was an ex-serviceman. Yet Germany of today differs from Germany of yesterday [in spite of some ugly reminders to the contrary]. The PLO was and still remain a disputed entity, with each dissenting party representing the interest of another Arab or Muslim country, with one thing in common; the heart of international terrorism.

As mentioned above, the PLO is severely divided. Such divisions, if realized in the West Bank and Gaza, will convert the area to a second Lebanon. Israel cannot expose itself to more instability "next door", to another version of the introduction to Black September, to a "second Lebanon"59. The PLO's conflicts with Jordan, Syria [and therefore Lebanon], Saudi Arabia and the URA should lead all Arab leaders in the area to agree that for the sake of peace US's understanding that "the old guard of the PLO would never be a party to any negotiations" stands as a pillar of stability and reliability.

IX.       Syria

Confucius advised us "Study the past, if you would divine the future"60. The Golan Heights should remain an integral part of Israel. The regime in Syria should not be relied upon for the following reasons.

a.         The ruling Ba'ath Party always demonstrated brutality and cruelty, both internally and internationally, and as one of the world's leading sponsors of International terror61.

b.         As was mentioned before, both President Assad and his brother Rifat, are by far, the world leading drug trafficker. No decent individual would "buy a second hand car from them". Should any Israeli rely on their undertakings for safety?

           Here, I would add that the world would do a lot of good to generations to come, if Assad will be treated like Manuel Noriega, with a similar fashion US adopted to the Drag Cartel in Colombia. Offering Assad a place around the negotiating table equals to offering a similar position to Noriega. Both represent an absurd phenomenon62.

c.         Syria cannot be granted a credit line by controlling the Golan Heights, from which it can once again threaten the North of Israel.

Syria's strength lied with  foreign competition over the Middle East. The rivalry between The USA and the USSR was "delegated" to third rate countries who maintain an interest         either to escalate the tension with Israel [Iran] or promote the export of military equipment [North Korea]. Yet it is a matter of time before these two entities will not be able to support the Ba'ath party in Damascus. And as happened many a time before, unless Syria finds internal sources to maintain itself, it will decline62A. Syria has no alternative but to make peace with Israel, and therefore, not on Syria's terms.

The Druse in the Golan Heights should retain a similar status, mutatis mutandis to that held by the Arab residents of Jerusalem; i.e. they should, inter alia, hold Syrian Passports.  

X.        "Let us have peace63"

The milestone of this plan is a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, with the participation, in such a settlement, of the new Iraq, Syria, Jordan, the UAE, Yeman, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco Saudi Arabia, etc. Peace treaties should be extensive and ought to include the functioning of embassies, cultural and commercial treaties, etc.

XI.      Financial consideration

If Israel is to initiate such a plan, Israel should have the ability to challenge its international debt, in order to enable it to absorb all the necessary changes. Washington might consider the possibility to annul and nullify Israel's debt to the governmental sector of the USA, the greater portion of Israel's international debt, and thus enable Israel to achieve financial independence.

G.       CONCLUSIONS

The above represents our understanding of a compromise between the disputing parties within Israel. It is not an ideal optional plan, however, every compromise calls for a price. I fear that if the Israelis will not come to an understanding, they will be bound to accept much worse, as "if peace cannot be maintained with honor, it is no longer peace"64

The boat is cruising toward one direction. It will be wiser if Israel navigates it to safety, to peace, which is "above all earthly dignities"65.

Zalli Jaffe,

Jerusalem,

1.        Benjamin Disraeli, Speech in the House of Commons, 16th July, 1878.

2.         Barbara W. Tuchman, The First Salute, Alfred A. Knopf, [1988], P. 147.

3.         "The history of the past five hundred years of international rivalry, demonstrate that military security alone is never enough".  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers, Hayman [1988] P. 539.

4.         Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, [1992].

5.         George Will, Who is the Mideast Pillar, Newsweek, 26th October, 1981.

6.         Paul Kennedy, Note 3 ibid, P. 516.

6A        Avner Yaniv, Politics And Strategy In Israel, Hapoalim Library [Tel-Aviv] [1994] Page C.

7.         Israel's improved international position, was demonstrated by the number of new embassies in Israel.  These embassies represent both countries who renewed their diplomatic relation with Jerusalem [Russia, Africa], and countries who never maintained diplomatic relations with Israel [China, or in a qualified manner, India].  The new wind commenced long before the change of government in Israel.

7A        Why all of us should observe the Eleventh Commandment of Karl Popper, The Spectator, 24th September, 1994, P.27

8.         Harper Collins [1991].

8A.       ibid, P. 1026.  In this article emphasis is added by us unless otherwise stipulated.

8B        Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy,  Simon and Schuster [1994], P. 398

8C        Ropad to Victory, Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945, Martin Gilbert, Heineman [London] [1986] P. 389.

9          Ibid, P. 665.

9A        David Remnick, Lenin's Tomb, The Last Days of the Soviet Empire, Viking [1993], P. 15.

9A1      Martin Gilbert in an interview to BBC in 1984, as quoted by Michael Elliott, in The Grear Reversal, Newsweek 0f 8th May, 1995, P.22.

9A2      John Charmley,  What are We celebrating?,The Spectator, 29th April, 1995, P.15.

9B        Gerald L. Weinberg, A World At Arms, Cambridge University Press, [1994] P. 840.

9C        Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy,  ibid, note 9 P. 394.

9D        Amy Knight, Beria, Stalin's First Lieutenant, Princeton Univeraity Press, new Jersey, [1993] , P. 128.

10.        The US's policy in Korea was based on consideration, unavailable in Vietnam.  Max Hastian, The Korean War, Michael Joseph [1987], P. 419.

11.        If Mao Had Come to Washington, an Essay in Alternatives, Foreign Affairs, October, 1972, P. 44 [herinafter "Tuchman"];  see also, Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors, Mao and Deng: A Dual Biography, Harper Collins [1992], P. 85.

12.        Tuchman, ibid, P. 44

13.        ibid; P. 45

14.        Ibid;  P. 46.  For that matter, Barbara Tuchman condemns US policy regarding China itself.  "We [The US - SZJ] reached in China exactly the opposite of what had been our object"; ibid,  P. 64.  "The entire effort predicated on the validity of the Nationalists government was wasted"; ibid. Moreover, "The attack by North Korea had come as a total surprise" ... Just that June [prior to the commencement of hostilities - SZJ] testifying on Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for Far eastern Affairs Dean Rusk had said he saw no likelihood for war in Korea, David McCullough, Truman.Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992 P. 777.

14A      Kissinger, Diplomacy, note 9 ibid, P. 627.

15.        Note, Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy Vs. Khruschev, Faber & Faber, [1991]; Diano A. Brugiani, Eyball to Eyball, Random House [1991].

15A      Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of The the Monroe Doctrine, Hill and Wang, New York [1994], P. 91

15B      Donald kagan, On The origin Of War And The preservation Of Peace, Doubleday, New York, [1995], P. 454.

15B1     Beschloss, Kennedy Vs. Khruschev note 15, ibid, P. 119.

15C.     Modern Times, Revised Edition,  Harper Collins, [1991],  P. 629.  In the first year of John F. Kennedy's presidential administration, four developments appeared to be unrelated - America's humiliation at the Bay of Pigs in April, Kennedy's confrontation with Nikita Khruschev in August six weeks later, the raising of the Berlin Wall in August, and, in December, the first commitment of American ground troops in Indochina. Yet each event had led to the next.  Khruschev saw the Cuban fiasco as evidence that the young president was weak.  Therefore he bullied him in Vienna.  In the mistaken  belief that he had intimidated him there, he built the Wall.  Kennedy answered the challenge by sending four hundred Green Berets to Southeast Asia, explaining to those around him that 'we have a problem making our power credible, and Vietnam looks like the place", William Manchester, A World Lit Only By Fire,Little, Brown and Company [1992]. Johnson's attitude towrds Kennedy was shared by The age Australian newspaper vis-a-vis President Clinton "[who] has ... confirmed suspicions that when it comes to foreign affairs, the U.S. has an unsettling tendency to do too little, too late or too much, too soon", quoted in  The Times of 12th July, 1993, P. 11 Anthony Verrier's review of Divided We Stand, The US and The Suez Crisis, by W. Scott Lucas, in the Financial Times, 12th october, 1991, Quoted by John Loftus and  Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against The Jews, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994, P. 560, note 48.

15D      Michael R. Beschloss, note 15, ibid, P. 7.

16A      Kissinger, Diplomacy, note 9 ibid, P. 536.  Kennedy's misunderstanding was shared by other policy makers in the USA.  When writting of henry kissinger's approach to the Greece - Cyprus  crisis of 1974, Tom Boyatt indicated that "it would be hard to imagine judgements more divorced from reality then these.  Asc events will show, the facts of the matter were just the opposite".Peter Murtagh, The Rape of Greece, Simon & Schuster, England, [1994] P. 251.

16A1     Martin Gilbert, Never Despair, Winston S. Churchill, 1945-1964,Heinmann, London [1988], P. 1250. Indeed, on accassions, the USA used force to guarantee its interests. when tension broke loose in Lebanon, "President [ Camille] Chamoun appealed for support from the United States. Within hours, American carrier-borne troops landed in Beirut" ibid, P. 1270.

16B      Kissinger, Diplomacy, not 9 ibid, P.544

16B1     Martin Gilbert, Fist World War,Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London [1994], P. 53, foot note 2.

16C      Jissinger, Diplomacy, note 9, ibibd, P. 580

16D      ibid, P. 581

16E      ibid P. 587

16F       ibid P. 589. The German Chancellor was not the first to  make such conclusions.  Amerixa "made the first impression after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.  "The victorious Japanese had promised to respect the independence of Korea, and the United States had pledged to uphold that independence with moral support"  but Japan "crush[ed] Korea, ite emperor, and his court" David Fromking, In The Time of The American,Knopf, New York [1995] P. 49.

16G, McCullough, Truman, note 14, ibid, P. 486

16H      ibid, P. 486. Truman tried to "balance" his support for England by inviting Stalin to speak at the University of  Missouri, to counter Churchill's visit and hostile speach.  Stalin, of course declined the invitation, ibid, P. 490.

17.        This, although the North Vietnamese were compelled to come to the negotiation table.  "He [Kissinger - SZJ] calculated that the North Vietnamese would compromise only if menaced with total annihilation .... but like his predecessors, Kissinger never found their breaking point".  Stanley Kanow, Vietnam, A History, The Viking Press, [1983]; see also Henrey Kissinger, White House Years, Little Brown, [1979], P. 698.

18.        Tuchman,  note 11 ibid, P. 64.

18A      Quoted by Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials,Alfred A. Knopf , NY, [1992], P.636.

18B      Kissinger, Diplomacy, note 9 ibid, P. 633.

18C      ibid, P. 636.

18D      ibid, P. 859.     

18E      ibid, P. 802.

19.        Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, Bantom Books [1982], P. 435.

20.        ibid, P. 454.  See also Amir Taheri, The Unknown Life of The Shah, Hutchinson, [1991].

21.        The New York Times, 20th November, 1991.

22.        Hugo Young, One of Us, Final Edition, Mcmilan, [1991], P. 278. 

23.        Ronald Reagan, An American Life, Hutchinson, [1990], P. 450.  Was the invasion to Grenada in accordance to International Law?  See The US Action in Grenada, American Journal of International Law, [1989], Vol. 78 #1, P. 131.

24.        Young, note 21 ibid, P. 346.

24A.     "[Syrian foreign minister proclaimed that Lebanon and Syria are one state", Robert Satloff, Assad Role Is Clear: On a Brink, International Herald Tribune, 29th July, 1993,  Page 6.

25.        Bullock, Note 8 ibid, P. 25.

26.        Secretary of State, Warren Christopher suggested that now, the US does seek the removal of Saddam Hussein. CBS, Face The Nation, 29th March, 1993.

27.        20th January, 1992, P. 13.

27A      General Sir Peter De la Billiere, Looking for Trouble, Harper Collins Publishers, London, [1994], P. 420.

27B      In an interview to Sir David Frost, aired by Sky News, on the 16th            January, 1996, at 6:30 A.M. London Time.

28.        US News and World Report, Triumph without Victory, Random House, [1992], P. 15;  Note also Time International, Vol. 44, 2nd November, 1992, P. 42.

29.        Mohammed H. Heikel, Illusions of Triumph, an Arab View of the Gulf War, Harper Collins, [1992], P. 173.

30.        US News, note 28 ibid, P. 26.

31.        Heikel, note 27 ibid, note 27.

31A      Newsweek, 24th october, 1994, P. 14.  France's and Russia's declared policies in the October crisis only complicated UN's position as  both countries disagreed with US's position that the UN charter gave them authority to take military action. The Economist, October 22nd - 28th, 1994, P. 58

32.        note 27, ibid.

33.        Ma'ariv, 12th February, 1992.

33A      The  Wall Street Journal,  28th November, 1994, P. 1.

33B      USA today, 28th November, 1994, P. 1.

34.        BBC World service News, 8th November, 1992; "Even in this most genocidal of all centuries, the Khmer Rouge stand on a par with the Nazis as being the most murderous of all". Walter Isaacson, Kissinger, a biography . Simon & Schuster [1992] P. 274. 

34A      Most Favored Tyrants, The Spectator, 28th May, 1994, P.5.

34B      Martin Gilbert, Fist World War, note 16B1, P. 437.

34B1     Quoted by Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, note 9 ibid, note 9C, [1994], P. 46. This principle was contradicted by Us's administrations on numeros occassions.  A prime example is US attitude towards Francisco Franco after the Second World War. Many leading Americans were pressing Spain's interests with the administrations in washington.  Such "leading Americans" included Joseph McCarthy, the Republican Senator for Wisconsin, Senator Pat McCarran, and many others senators and congressmen who "paraded through Madrid at Spain's expense"  One of the junketers, Ja,es J. Murphy, Democratic Congressman for New York, called Franco a 'very, very lovely, and loveable, character". Paul Preston, Franco, A Biography,Harper Collins Publishers, London, [1993] P. 591.  To add gross insult to injury, in 1951, The Caudillo named Erquiza y Lequerica as ambassador to washington.   Mr. Lequerica's nomination as an Ambassador to Washington was rejected by President Truman in 1946. ibid, P. 603.  Wilson's dictum did not stop Harry Schwartz, to become later, the deputy assistant secretary for international affairs at the Pentagon to state "We respect the efforts of individual members of NATO to solve their domestic difficulties just as they respect our efforts to solve our own internal problems", Murtagh, The Rape of Greece note 16A ibid, P.154.  Mr. Schwartz's remarks were in response to the presentation of evidence according to which the "colonels" in Athens were torturing and otherwise acting against all standard of human rights.

34C      The Spectator, 25th June, 1994, P. 5.

34D      Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace, Random house, NY, [1994], P. 249. China is challenged by the same problem.  Capitalizm is threatening the system in China. note inter alia The Wall Street Journal, 19thth December, 1994, P. 1.

34E      "I do not want the United States to have the postwar burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkan.  This is not our task at a distance of 3,500 miles or more.  It is definitely a British Task in which the British are far more vitally interested then we are", quoted by Kissinger, ibid, P. 396.

35.        William Manchester, American Caesar, Little Brown [1978].

36.        Quoted by Jean La Couture, De Gaulle, The Ruler, 1945-1970, Harvill [1991],  P. 367.  Frances policy should have been anticipated by the USA, during and before the execution of the Marshall Plan.  The Government in Paris endeavored the Monnet Plan in the interest of pursuing their policy of remaining neutral between America and Russia of balancing the two major powers against one another, and leaving France to lead Europe.  Charles L. Mee Jr.  The Marshall Plan, Simon & Shuster, [1984] P. 114. De Gaulle tried the same policy over the Berlin crisis when he "wanted France to percieve in Bonn as a more reliable ally than America and gradually to substitute French for American Leadership. Kissinger Diplomacy, ibid note 9 P. 606.  That is why De gaulle objected to Keenedy's "vision of an Atlantic partnership based on the twen pillars of Europe and America", ibid, P. 616.

37.        Paul Kennedy  Preparing For The Twenty-First Century, Harper-Collins, London [1993], P. 144.

38.        Information Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century, The Free Press, [1992].

39.        Tuchman, note 11 ibid, 64,

39A      In The Time of The Americans, note 16F, ibid, P. 76.

39A1     Kissinger, Diplomacy, note 34B ibid, P. 27.

40.        Francis Fukuyama, ibid note 4, P. 249.

41.        Walter Isaacson, ibid, note 34, P. 308.

42.        A similar challenge under different circumstances is  facing China and India, Kennedy, ibid, note 35A, P. 179

43.        Katilina 9, quoted by Israel Shatzman, The History of The Roman Republic, Magness Press, The Hebrew University, [1990]  P. 7.

43A      In an address to the Conference on International Terrorism in Jerusalem, July, 1979. quoted by William Safire,Lend Me Your Ears, Norton & Co. London, [1992] P. 534.

43B      Egypt as a whole is fighting militancy,which militant are trying to overthrow the regime and replace it with Islamic republic. Newsweek, 2nd August, 1993, P. 24.

43C      Kissinger, Diplomacy, note 9 ibid, p.405.

43D      ibid, P. 506.

43E      ibid, P. 621.

43F       ibid, P. 683

43G      as Hanoi did vis-a-vis  public opinion in the USA, ibid, P. 685

43H      ibid, P. 700, note also Barbara Tuchman, the text to note 2 above.

43I        ibid, P. 719.

44.        John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding.

International Herald Tribune [London], 28th February, 1996, P. 1.

44B      Yaniv, note 6A ibid, P. 247.

45.        An interview  in the Zuriche Woche, September, 1961.

45A      Maariv, 18th, 1994 P. 3.

46.        Kennedy, note 37 ibid, P. 111.

47.        Hereinunder.

48.        Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought, Britain, Germany and the coming of the Great War, Random house, [1991],  P. 732.  Note also, Francis Fukuyama note 4 ibid, P. xiii.  Francis. Fukuyama refers also to non democratic states with successful economies, [P.xv].  However, the examples he offers are of countries with internal peace who are not threaten by outside hostility; i.e. Singapore;  Note also Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 1899-1919, Collins Harvill, [1990],  P. 112.

49.        "The hunger for an escape from political and economic frustration ... says 'Omar' the 30 year old product of a Gaza slum, and now a Hammas activist "I am a man with no home, no land, and so I have no identity.  Islam gives me my identity. Time International, 11th January, 1993, P. 19. "Stolypin had learned from experience that a prosperous village was a tranquil village.  And, indeed, in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I, the countryside, benefiting from improved yields, gave the authorities little trouble" Pipes, note 48 ibid, P. 192.  As if to demonstrate the accuracy of King Solomon who wrote "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that  which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun" Ecclesiastes, I;10.

50.        The original phrase was quoted by Paul Kennedy, note 3 ibid,  P. xxii.

51.        When considering black rule in Rhodesia "Kissinger and British officials added their own sweetener, a $2 billion safety net fund to protect whites from seizure of their property and to compensate them if they felt forced to leave their land" Isaacson, ibid, note 34, P. 690.

52.        Note point IV to the plan, hereinabove.

53.        Yassir Arafat expressed his true opinion of the Jews during a telephone conversation with PLO representative in Paris, Mr. Ibrahim Sus.  "Dirt remains dirt ... dogs ... the Jews, may their ancestors be cursed ... thank the rotten Jews, with whom I shall settle the account in the future..." CNN, 11th February, 1992; This, naturally, contrary to public statements o the contrary. Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial, Harper & Rau, [1984],  P. 33.

54.        note, inter alia, Abba Eban,  Personal Witness, Israel Through My Eyes,  Portman and Sons, New York, 1992, P. 592.

55.        Saddam's War, The Origin of the Kuwait Conflict and the International Response, Faber & Faber, [1991],  P. 158.

56.        8th February, 1991.

57.        see Page 21 hereinabove.

58.        As Saddam hussein is titled by TIME International of 11th February, 1992.

59.        "... But undoubtedly, it was the Palestinians who were the catalysts for civil war". Gower and Walker, Behind the Myth, Yassir Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution, W. H. Allen [1990], P. 143. The conflict within the PLO has all ready expressed itself, in the "usual" PLO manners. Its most senior victim was Assad Saftawi. Time International, 1st November, 1993, P. 19.

60.        "It is not often that nations learn from the past, even rarer that they draw the correct conclusions from it" Henry Kissinger, A World Restored, quoted in Walter Isaacson, ibis, note 34, P. 256

61.        "Syrian Diplomats would act as arms couriers";  in 1972 when the PLO planned the Munich Massacre.  Gower and Walker, note 59, ibid,  P. 96.  This policy was never altered by the regime in Damascus.

62.        See Fukuyama, note 40 ibid.

62A      Bernard Lewis, The Middle East, WEidenfeld and Nicolson, London [1995],         P.44.

63.        Ulysses Simpson Grant, Letter of acceptance of nomination, 12th May, 1868.

64.        Lord John Russell, Quoted in the Times, 21th September, 1853.

65.        William shakespeare, Henry VIII.4